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Abstract 
 
We discuss several measurements of equity components in CBs and then examine 
the short-run announcement effects and the long-run performances surrounding CB 
issuances by dividing the whole sample of CBs into a debt-like portfolio, a mixed 
portfolio and an equity-like portfolio. At the time of the CB issuance announcements, the 
market reactions to different portfolios strictly follow a hierarchy predicted by the 
pecking order hypothesis. In the long-run subsequent to the CB issuances, the buy and 
hold stock returns of the equity-like portfolio significantly underperform the industry and 
market benchmarks and the debt-like portfolio; the operating performances of the issuers 
that issuance equity-like CBs significantly deteriorated from the pre issuance period, 
inducing them to underperform both the issuers that issuance debt-like CBs and their 
non-issuing counterparts; and also, the equity-like portfolio went through the most 
significant increase in the idiosyncratic risk and the total equity risk, which however still 
do not differ significantly from their industry levels. Furthermore, we notice that the CB 
issuers’ post issuance long-run performances are to a large extent consistent with the 
short-run market reactions they received. By controlling the equity risks, we contend that 
the market is able to form an unbiased foresight of the future operating performances of 
the CB issuers at the time of the CB issuances, and the short-run announcement effects 
are mostly determined by this market perception. 
Keywords:  convertible bond issuance, hedge ratio, announcement effect, long-run 
performance. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Convertible Bonds (CBs) are hybrid securities with mixed characteristics of straight debts, 
common equities, as well as options. They share the most similarities with straight debts 
when they are issued by companies, and they embody potential characteristics of 
common equities if they get converted during their life time. The most fascinating feature 
of CB is that it involves dual options for both the issuer and the investors. On one hand, 
CBs which are callable allow the issuers to forcibly convert them into equities when 
satisfying certain conditions. On the other hand, the investors can opt whether to convert 
by the time the CB is called by the issuer or by the time of the final maturity. If the CB 
ends up with being in-the-money, the investor can exercise the imbedded call warrant by 
converting the CB into a predetermined amount of equities of the issuer’s. Otherwise, if 
the issuer’s stock performs poorly and the CB ends up with being out-of-the-money, the 
investors will not convert and the issuer has to redeem the CB by paying cash to the 
investors.  
 
In a CB contract, many provisions and conditions are stipulated, which allow for more 
flexibility for both the issuer and the investors, but they complicate the valuation and 
investigation of CB in the meantime. For example, in some cases the CB contracts 
specify call notice periods, which require the issuers to announce the dates to call in 
advance. Some contracts also have call protections or soft call features, the former of 
which restrict the CBs to be non-callable within the period of call protections and the 
latter of which restrict the CB to be callable only when the underlying stock prices 
maintain above a level for a certain period of time. In some other cases, put options are   2
also provided so that the investors can even choose to return CBs to the issuers at a 
specific time and price. In general, the opportunity to convert CBs into equities benefits 
the investors by allowing them to share the growth potential of the bond issuer, whereas 
in compensation the investors receive coupon payments lower than that of the regular 
straight debts.  
 
In literatures, researches from various aspects are developed to shed light on this complex 
hybrid security, such as investigations in the issuers’ decision-makings to offer CBs, the 
optimal call strategies of the issuers, the market reactions to companies’ announcements 
of CB issuances, the market reactions when CBs are formally issued, the market reactions 
when companies announce call decisions, the post-issuance long-run performances of the 
CB issuers’ stock returns and operations, the investors’ and arbitragers’ decision-makings, 
the models for pricing and valuating CB, and so forth.  
 
Empirical studies into the market reactions to CB issuances find that on average market 
reacts negatively to companies’ CB issuance announcements. The negative 
announcement effects due to companies’ external financing decisions have been well 
documented in literatures, which describe that the announcements of companies’ external 
financings are often accompanied with non-positive stock market reactions to the issuer’s 
outstanding shares. The announcements of common equity issuances (IPOs or SEOs) are 
found to be followed by large degrees of negative market reactions, slightly and 
insignificantly non-positive market reactions are found to be concomitant with the 
straight debt issuances, and the degrees of negative reactions to CB issuances are found   3
to be in between that of the equity issuances and the straight debt issuances. For example, 
Mikkelson and Partch (1986) report that at the announcement of CB issuances, the 
abnormal stock returns are significantly negative (average prediction error = -1.97%, z-
value=-4.94), which is lower than the abnormal returns at the common stock issuances 
(average prediction error=-3.56%, z-value=-9.81) and much higher than that at the 
straight debt issuances (-0.23 %, z-value=-1.40).  
 
The different announcement effects for different financing instruments can be explained 
by the pecking order hypothesis of the “M&M model” (Myers and Majluf, 1984), which 
is developed under the assumption of asymmetric information. The hypothesis assumes 
that managers have information advantages over the public about the firms’ assets-in-
place and investment opportunities, thereby they decide to offer equities when their 
outstanding shares are overvalued by the market. Consequently, the issuances of equity or 
risky securities signal information of overvaluations to the market. Furthermore, the more 
risky the security is issued, the more negative the information is signaled about the firm, 
and then the more negatively the market reacts. Among a variety of instruments for 
external financing, common equities and straight debts are regarded as the most risky and 
the least risky ones, respectively. CB, which has mixed characteristics of straight debt 
and common equity, is thought to have a risk level in between that of the straight debt 
and the common equity. So, the different degrees of market reactions to the issuances of 
common equities, CBs, and straight debts are consistent with the prediction of pecking 
order hypothesis.  
   4
However, unlike standard financing instruments such as the common equities and the 
straight debts, CBs are nonstandard financing instruments whose exact characteristics are 
contingent on whether they get converted in the future, making the analysis into CB 
issuances more complicated. As Stein (1992) noted that CBs in general can be viewed as 
backdoor equities, because most companies that offer CBs are in the hope of converting 
them into equities in a later time. Davidson, Glascock and Schwartz (1995) also argued 
that on average the issuance of CBs send an equity-like signal to the market.  
 
As the usages of CBs came into popularity since the 1980s, researchers turned to analyze 
CBs from a subsampling perspective rather than studying all of them as a whole, because 
the differences in conversion opportunities render them to be heterogeneous. In fact, 
some of the CBs are designed to be more like common equities, while others share more 
similarities with straight debts. Different measurements of equity components in CBs are 
put forward, for example, Janjigian (1987), Davidson, Glascock and Schwartz (1995), 
Burlacu (2000), Loncarski, Horst and Veld (2006), Ammann, Fehr and Seiz (2006), and 
so forth. The studies into the announcement effects of CB issuances find that the 
announcement effects differ for CBs with different degrees of equity components. In 
general it is found that the more equity-like the CB is offered, the more negatively the 
market reacts, which suggests the validity of the prediction from pecking order 
hypothesis within the universe of CBs.  
 
While many researches are restricted to the announcement period market reactions to CB 
issuances, attention paid to the issuers’ post-issuance long-run performances is quite   5
insufficient. Lee and Loughran (1998) examined the long-run performances of CB 
issuers’ stock returns, and they reported that in the long-run subsequent to the CB 
issuances, the issuers’ stocks returns significantly underperform the market benchmarks. 
Still less attention is paid to analyzing the issuers’ post-issuance long-run operating 
performances. Since stock prices are reflections of the issuers’ operating and thus earning 
performances, it is likely that the poor performances in stock returns are fundamentally 
driven by the downturns in the issuers’ operating performances. A study into the long-run 
operating performances of the CB issuers’ is therefore quite necessary. According to the 
predictions of the pecking order theory, companies that offer common equities worth less 
than what the market perceives. Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-
Graves (1995) found that issuers of SEOs underperform the non-issuing matching firms 
during the five years following the equity issuances, and Lee and Loughran (1998) and 
Lewis, Rogalski and Seward (2001) found similar underperformance for companies that 
offer CBs.  
 
The CB market in the United States makes up the largest proportion of the global CB 
market, which is a highly liquid. In this paper, we explore the data of CB issuances on the 
US market over the past 3 decades from 1976 to 2006, and we analyze both the short-run 
announcement effects and the long-run performances of CB issuers. In view of the 
heterogeneity among different CBs, our study is developed from a subsampling 
perspective. We test our conjecture that in the long-run subsequent to the CB issuances, 
companies that offer equity-like CBs underperform the companies that offer debt-like 
CBs both in terms of stock returns and in terms of operating incomes, which is in line   6
with the pecking order prediction. 
 
This paper contributes to the existing literatures mainly in the following aspects. Firstly, 
to our knowledge, this is the first study that intends to analyze the long-run performances 
of CB issuances from a subsampling perspective according to the relative equity 
components in CBs. Secondly, several different variables that measure the equity 
components in CBs are introduced and discussed in this paper. Thirdly, for our study 
objective, the US CB issuances, it is the first study that examines both the announcement 
effect and the long-run performance from a subsampling perspective. Fourthly, we 
confirm the findings in previous researches that the stock market on average reacts 
negatively to the CB issuances at the announcement periods and that the issuers on 
average experience post-issuance long-term underperformances in both stock returns and 
operating incomes. Fifthly, we report that in the short-run announcement period, the 
equity-like portfolio (debt-like) receives the largest (slightest) degree of negative market 
reaction, and in the long-run subsequent the CB issuances, the issuers that offer equity-
like CBs significantly underperform companies that offer debt-like CBs in terms of stock 
return performances as well as operating performances, which are not driven by the 
industry factors. Also, the equity-like portfolio experienced the most significant increase 
in idiosyncratic risk and total equity-risk during the years subsequent to the CB issuances. 
Lastly, by associating the short-run announcement period market reactions with the long-
run stock return and operating performances of each subsample CBs, we find that the 
long-run performances and the short-run announcement effects are to a large extend 
consistent with each others. Therefore, we contend that the market is able to adjust its   7
previous conception and then form an unbiased forecast of the CB issuers’ future 
operating performances immediately after the CB issuances.  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review into the existing 
literatures about the reason why firms offer CBs, the announcement effects CB issuances, 
the long-run performances of the CB issuers, and the explanations for the empirical 
evidence. In section 3, we summarize and compare several variables that measure the 
relative equity-components in different CBs. In section 4, we describe the data and 
sample used in this paper, and then we view into the differences between the subsample 
portfolios. In section 5, we report and discuss our findings of the short-run announcement 
effect and the issuers’ long-run stock return performances, operating performances, and 
changes in equity risks. In section 6, we reach a conclusion and put forward some 
directions for future research.  
 
2. Literatures Review 
 
2.1 Why Firms Offer Convertible Bonds 
 
Many researchers, such as Pilcher (1955), Brigham (1966), Hoffmeister (1977), Stein 
(1992), Davidson, Glascock and Schwarz (1995) hold the view that the ultimate goals of 
most CB issuers are to raise equities through conversions. But if so, why don’t these 
firms offer common equities directly, instead of using the indirect way of CBs? A lot of 
researches therefore try to address this issue.  
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According to traditional capital structure theories, firms make financing decisions out of 
considerations of reaching an optimal capital structure. By issuing CBs, firms on one 
hand benefit from the reduction in tax and the agency costs of free cash flow, and on the 
other hand increase other costs such as the cost of bankruptcy. So, an optimal debt-equity 
ratio is achieved by balancing the effects so as to maximize the firm’s value.  
 
Another point of view suggests that CBs can help firms mitigate problems caused by 
capital market imperfections, such as information costs, risk-shifting problems, 
managerial discretion, security overpricing, and overinvestment in risky projects or 
negative NPV projects. Brennan and Schwartz (1988) and Stein (1992) consider that 
firms use CBs to signal information about the reduced adverse selection costs associated 
with pure equity issues. It is also believed that firms are able to use CB to mitigate the 
risk shifting problem (Green, 1984), by applying the call provisions to shorten the 
effective maturity of the bonds. In addition, firms who issue CBs can restrict the 
overinvestment incentives of managers (Mayers, 1998). Although there are alternative 
solutions to the problems of capital market imperfections, such as waiting until 
information costs decline, eliminating risk-shifting problems by maintaining all-equity 
capital structures, and mitigating managerial discretion problems by increasing debt 
levels, each alternative also has limitations. Likewise, the employments of CBs are also 
out of considerations of balancing benefits and costs.  
 
The sequential financing hypothesis, which is based on the assumption of uncertainties 
about firms’ future investment opportunities, gains lots of agreements in literatures in   9
explaining the function of CBs. Harris and Artur (1985) first modeled and pointed out 
that CBs can be designed to satisfy firms’ sequential financing requirements. Mayers 
(1998) argue that firms finance their planned multistage investment programs with 
convertibles, where the call provision plays an essential role in reducing the costs in 
sequential financing problem. By forcing conversion, firms can retain the funds that they 
raised previously, and thus reduce costs by accessing the capital market. Chang, Chen 
and Liu (2004) noted that CBs are cost-effective for firms with promising growth 
opportunities, because CBs allows the issuers to proceed with their financing plans by 
forcing conversion when the investment options are valuable. Much evidence is found to 
be consistent with sequential signaling hypothesis. Korkeamaki and Moore (2004) found 
that call protections are shorter for firms that experience higher levels of capital 
investment soon after the issuances and that CBs with weak or no call protection are 
offered by firms which invest greater amounts soon after issuance than those issuing CBs 
with strong protection. Therefore, Korkeamaki and Moore (2004) concluded that the 
designs of call provisions are consistent with the firm’s need for short-term financing 
flexibility.  
 
Some other theories consider that CBs may not necessarily be offered in order to signal 
information, eliminate risk-shifting problems, or reduce overinvestment incentives. 
Brennan and Schwartz (1988) argue that firms with difficulties in estimating their risks 
are likely to issue CBs. Lewis, Rogalski and Seward (2001) argued that firms may choose 
to issue CBs when they have anticipated declines in operating profits which dominate a 
corresponding reduction in systematic business risks. They further deduce that the reason   10
why firms choose CBs rather than common equities might be because those firms are 
rationed out of the equity market due to high costs of adverse selection. Since adverse 
selection costs are higher in larger security offers (Krasker, 1986), firms may not be able 
to obtain larger amounts of capital from the stock market. Cornelli and Yosha (2003) 
showed that convertible securities and stage financing are extensively used in venture 
capital financing. Isagawa (2002) showed that CBs may be designed so that it will not be 
converted after undertaking a value-decreasing project but it will be converted after 
undertaking a value-increasing project. Hence, well-designed CBs can simultaneously 
eliminate the threat of a hostile takeover and the threat of bankruptcy, and CBs are 
therefore more desirable than straight debt for a self-interested manager.  
 
2.2 Evidence of Announcement Effects 
 
CB issuers in the US market have long been the most intensely studied objectives in 
literatures. Many researches reveal that on average the US stock market reacts 
significantly negative to the announcements of CB issuances. Dann and Mikkelson (1984) 
reported a -2.31% announcement period average abnormal stock returns, Mikkelson and 
Partch (1986) reported a -1.97% change in issuers’ stock prices, and similar results are 
also found by Eckbo (1986), Janjigian (1987), Eugene (1992), Davidson, Glascock and 
Schwartz (1995), Lewis, Rogalski and Seward (2003), etc. The only exception is found 
by Fields and Mais (1991) when they examined the privately placed CBs. They reported 
a significantly positive (1.8 %) stock market reaction. But because most CBs are offered 
to the public, private placements can be assessed separately, which do not affect the 
general finding of negative market reactions to CB issuances.    11
 
Besides the US CB market, Japan, Europe, and Non-Japan Asia regions are the other 
major CB markets worldwide. Researches on market reactions to CB issuances in 
markets other than the US market are carried out more recently. For instance, Abhyankar 
and Dunning (1999) studied the UK market, Burlacu (2000) studied the French market, 
Dutordoir and Gucht (2004) studied the western European market, Loncarski, Horst and 
Veld (2006) studied the Canadian market, and Ammann, Fehr and Seiz (2006) studied the 
Germany and Switzerland market. Those studies report negative market reactions to CB 
issuances, which are similar to the findings in the US market. However, few exceptions 
are noticed outside of the US market as well. De Roon and Veld (1995) examined CB 
issuances in Dutch market and found significantly positive market reactions. Chang, 
Chen and Liu (2004) explored the Taiwanese-listed firms and found significantly positive 
abnormal returns. Results found on the Japanese market are inconsistent. Kang and Stulz 
(1996) showed a significantly positive market reaction to the Japanese CB issuers, and 
they argued that such phenomenon was due to the unique features of the corporate 
finance arrangements of Japanese companies. Whereas, the latest research by Cheng, 
Visaltanachoti and Kesayan (2005) report that the market reactions to CB issuances in the 
Japanese market are also significantly negative.  
 
2.3 Evidence of Long-run Performances of Convertible Bond Issuers 
 
Previous researches have examined the post issuance performances of straight debt 
issuers, CB issuers, and common stock issuers. Hansen and Crutchley (1990) found that 
all issuers experienced post issuance earning decreases and the decreases for the common   12
stocks issuers were the largest. Bae, Jeong, Sun and Tang (2002) found that prior to the 
security issuances, the buy-and-hold stock returns of all issuers were higher than the 
benchmarks
1, and the outperformance of the common stock issuers were found to be 
significant. After the security issuances, all issuers underperform benchmarks in terms of 
average buy-and-hold returns, where only the buy-and-hold returns of the median straight 
debt issuer continued to outperform benchmarks. Bae, Jeong, Sun and Tang (2002) also 
examined the issuers’ operating performances surrounding the securities issuances and 
found similar outperformances in operating performances prior to the issuances of all 
three types of securities and post issuance downturns in their performances.  
 
In researches that focus on CB issuances, empirical evidence show that during the post-
issuance years, the CB issuers on average underperform both in terms of stock returns 
and in terms of operating incomes. Lee and Loughran (1998) found that the average 
annual return by holding the CB issuers’ shares over five years after the CB issuances 
was 8.6%, compared to 12.5% of that of that of the matching firms’ and 14.5% of that of 
the NYSE/Amex value-weighted index’s. On the other hand, they showed that the CB 
issuers’ average annual stock return during years prior to the issuances was 54.2%, 
compared to 23.2% of that of the value-weighted market index’s. Similar findings are 
documented by Hansen and Crutchley (1990) that stock prices increased prior to the 
issuances of CBs and decreased since then, Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1999) that the 
median issuer’s five-year holding period return underperformed that of its matched 
counterpart’s by -19.8% (significantly different from zero), Eckbo, Masulis and Norli 
                                                 
1 Bae, Jeong, Sun and Tang (2002) chose benchmarks from nonissuers whose market value of equity and 
book-to-market ratio are the closest to the issuers’.    13
(2000) that the equal-weighed five-year buy and hold stock return of the NYSE/Amex-
listed CB issuers underperform that of their industry and size matchers by -29.5% (p-
value=0.012), and Lewis, Rogalski and Seward (2001) that during the five years after CB 
issuances, issuers underperform the CRSP value-weighted index and their comparison 
firms by 580 and 530 basis points, respectively, on a per year basis.  
 
Concurrent with the low stock returns subsequent to the CB issuances, the operating 
performances of the issuers’ are also found to be degenerate. Lee and Loughran (1998) 
and Lewis, Rogalski and Seward (2001) reported that in the four years prior to the CB 
issuances, the issuers’ annual operating performance exceeded that of the comparison 
firms, while in contrast, in the years following the CB issuances, the issuers’ operating 
performances declined greatly, and the poor performance can only be partly explained by 
the issuers’ industry factors.   
 
2.4 Explanations for Empirical Evidences 
 
Many studies both theoretical and empirical have been carried out trying to interpret the 
reasons why the stock market reacts negatively to CB issuances and what are the 
determinants of the post-issuance poor performances of the issuers. Basically, these 
explanations are developed under the assumption of asymmetric information, where 
corporate managers are assumed to have information advantages over the outside 
investors about firms’ true values and growth prospects. 
   14
The agency problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and the problem of free cash flows 
(Jensen, 1986) are firstly noticed by researchers out of the consideration of asymmetric 
information. Both theories imply that external financing activities by companies which 
have severer agency problems are received more negatively by the market. But 
empirically such prediction is not substantiated, because companies’ financial slacks are 
found to be insignificantly related to the degrees of announcement period market 
reactions, for example Eugene (1992). 
 
Green (1984), Ambarish, John and Williams (1987), and Eugene (1992) suggest that the 
market reactions to new financings are associated with the growth opportunities of the 
issuers’. They argue that upon a new equity issuance, a negative stock price response may 
be observed in the mature firms and a positive stock price response may be expected in 
the growth firms. Eugene (1992) proxied companies’ growth opportunities using 
dividend policies, and he empirically showed that the announcement period abnormal 
return for the mature issuers are significantly negative (-1.13), while the reaction to 
growth issuers are non-negative (0.01, although insignificant), which support this 
explanation.  
 
Miller and Rock (1985) modeled that market reactions are related to the sizes of the 
financings, which has an explanation similar to an earlier capital structure decision model 
of Fama and Miller (1972). Fama and Miller (1972) predicted that unanticipated 
financing signals information of firms’ earnings downturns, and Miller and Rock (1985) 
predicted that the amount of unexpected outside financings are commensurate with the   15
discrepancies between the actual and the expected earnings cash flows. As a result, the 
larger the amount of unexpected funding is, the worse the stock market reacts. But such 
predictions were rejected by empirical tests, such as Eckbo (1986), Mikkelson and Partch 
(1986), Hansen and Crutchley (1990), and Lee and Loughran (1998), all of which found 
insignificant relationship between the market reactions and the sizes of the proceeds.  
 
Under the assumption of asymmetric information, Myers and Majluf (1984) modeled and 
predicted that if managers act in the interests of the existing share holders, they will make 
decisions to issue new stocks when their outstanding shares are overvalued by the market. 
By realizing this, the market reacts negatively to the announcements of new equity 
issuances, and firms follow a pecking order to procure financings, starting with a best 
choice of internal financings, followed by debt financings, and ending with the last 
choice of equity financings. The companies’ financing decision hence signal information 
to the market. The degrees of negative market reactions are dependent on different level 
of risks that the newly offered securities involve. The riskier the security is offered, the 
more negatively the market will interpret it.  
 
Empirical findings are generally in support of the pecking order hypothesis. Loughran 
and Ritter (1995) further developed the windows of opportunity hypothesis from a similar 
starting point, and they predict that firms will issue common stocks when they are 
overvalued and then those firms will experience lower post issuance performances. In 
addition, it is found that the prediction from pecking order hypothesis is compatible with 
the growth hypothesis of Green (1984), Ambarish, John and Williams (1987), and   16
Eugene (1992). Eugene (1992) showed that after controlling differences in companies’ 
growth opportunities, the declines in stock prices upon issuances of common equities are 
significantly greater than the declines upon debt issuances. He thus concluded that the 
market response to a security issuance is a function of the growth opportunities of the 
issuers and the riskiness the new issuance involves.  
 
3. Valuation and Equity Components of Convertible Bonds 
 
3.1 Valuation of Convertible Bonds 
 
One approach to valuing CB is to view one unit of CB as one unit of straight debt plus 
one unit of call warrant. Therefore, CB also has its issue size (gross proceeds), issue date, 
date of maturity, par value (denomination), and coupon rate, which is the same as a 
straight debt. The additional features of CB due to its embedded warrant are conversion 
price and conversion ratio. The conversion price is the price at which investors may 
exchange CBs for the issuers’ equities, and the conversion ratio is the rate defining how 
many shares of equities each unit of CB can be converted. On top of that, CBs which 
have call protections cannot be called by issuers within the time periods when CBs are 
under protections.  
 
Following this approach, the theoretical value of CB is the sum of the straight investment 
value and the warrant value. Since the call warrant embedded in a CB is the same as a 
typical call option, except that the exercise of a call option does not change the number of 
the issuer’s outstanding shares but the exercise of a call warrant creates dilution effect by 
increasing the number of outstanding shares, the value of the embedded call warrant can   17
thus be approximated by the value of the call option. (The exact value of warrant which 
takes into account the dilution effect is provided in Appendix I.) 
 
Assume that the underlying stock price of CB, t S , follow a geometric Brownian motion 
(or Wiener process), which is a specific type of stochastic Markov process, where the 
change in price is unpredictable using its historical performances, so that  
 
                                                          t t t dW dt S dS σ μ + = /                                                (1) 
 
where  μ is the drift, σ   is the stock volatility, and  t W  is  standard  Brownian  motion. 
Under this assumption, the modified Black-Scholes option pricing model which 
accommodates dividend payments (Black and Scholes, 1973 and Merton, 1973) defines 
the value of the European call option as:  
 
                                               ) ( ) ( 2 1 d N e K d N e S C
rT dT ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ =
− −                                     (2) 
 
where S is current stock price and K is the conversion price, which are both lognormally 
distributed. σ  is the standard deviation of the continuously compounded stock return, d 
is the continuous compounded dividend yield, T is time to maturity, r is the continuously 
compounded risk free interest rate, N( ) is cumulative distribution function of a standard 
normal variable, 
T
T d r K S
d
σ
σ ) 2 / ( ) / ln(
2
1
+ − +
= , and  T d d σ − = 1 2 .  
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The investment value of CB is the sum of future coupons and principal payments and 
changes with time, interest rate, and credit spreads. When CB is exchanged for stock, the 
investment value is forgone, so the exercise value equals the investment value.  
 
                                Investment value = n
n
t t YTM
value par
YTM
coupon
) 1 ( ) 1 (
1 +
+
+ ∑ =                           (3) 
 
However, several defects follow from the above approach. Firstly, although we are able 
to make an adjustment for a continuously compounded dividend when applying the 
Black-Scholes model, discrete dividend payments could not be accommodated. Other 
complications such as issuer’s right to force conversion and investors rights to put are 
also not accounted in. The binomial tree model which determines the current value of 
CBs using backward inductions from the maturity provides a better solution to these 
problems. Firstly, the binomial tree model adjusts for discrete dividend payments at any 
given node of the tree. Secondly, the model also allows for force conversion, because 
most CBs are callable by the issuer. CBs that are callable are beneficial for the issuers 
because issuers have flexibility to change capital structures or refinance if interest rates 
fall. Since the gain of the issuers is the loss for investors, so the value of CB which is 
callable worth less than a CB which is not callable. Thirdly, some CBs also provide put 
options which allow the investors to return CBs to the issuer at a specific time and price 
in exchange for either cash or equities. The put option embedded in CB raises the value 
of CB. In addition, the binomial tree model also admits variation in the discount rates 
used at different nodes.  
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A third way of valuing CB is to view CB as a yield-enhanced stock plus a put option. The 
value of equity portion amounts to parity value of CB, which is equivalent to the multiple 
of the current stock price and the conversion ratio. The value of the put option can be 
obtained through put-call-parity,
rT dT e K P e S C
− − ⋅ − + ⋅ = , so that  
 
                                            ) ( ) ( 1 2 d N e S d N e K P
dT rT − ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅ ⋅ =
− −                                    (4) 
 
As a special type of debt, CB is also subject to the risk of default by its issuer, therefore 
several models also take into consideration the default probability. One approach is called 
structural approach, which assumes that when firm’s value reduces to a low threshold 
level, there will be default, such as Brennan and Schwartz (1977) and Ingersoll (1977), 
which assume that the interest rates are non-stochastic, and Brennan and Schwartz (1980), 
which assumes stochastic interest rates. Another approach is the reduced-form approach, 
the valuation of which does not depend on assumption of capital structure. At any point 
in time, the probability of default is determined by a Poisson process and characterized 
by a hazard function, for instance, the Tsiveriotis-Fernandes (1998) model and Ayache, 
Forsyth and Vetzal (2003) model.  
 
3.2 Measurements of Equity Components in Convertible Bonds 
 
Although all CBs embody hybrid properties of both debts and equities, some CBs are 
more like common equities by having greater potentials of getting converted into equities, 
while the other CBs are more resemblant to straight debts by having less conversion 
opportunities. As a result, a subsampling perspective which allows us to differentiate the   20
heterogeneities among subsample CBs is important because otherwise it will lead to 
confusions, and in addition a thorough examination into subsamples of CBs provides us 
an overview into the whole range of debt-equity capital structure. In the following part, 
we evaluate and compare several variables which measure the relative equity components 
in CBs.  
 
3.2.1 Moneyness 
 
It is almost always the case that CBs are offered out-of-the-money and become in-the-
money by the time of the final maturity or by the time when they are called. The distance 
between the current stock price (S) and the predetermined conversion price (K) provides a 
natural although rough measurement of the relative equity components in CBs. The 
difference between the conversion price and the current stock price is “moneyness”, the 
definitions for which do not reach a consensus among literatures.  
 
Bechmann (2001) define “moneyness” as the ratio of “conversion value/ the call 
payment”, which is the inverse of Beatty and Johnson (1985)’s definition, and both of 
them measure the potential of forced conversions of callable CBs. Carayannopoulos and 
Kalimipalli (2003) and Ammann, Kind and Wilde (2003) estimate the degree of 
“moneyness” as the ratio “CV/SB”, which is the ratio of the conversion value to the 
equivalent straight bond value (in terms of maturity, coupon, call features) obtained 
during the numerical process that derived the value of the CB. Yu (2005) and 
Zabolotnyuk, Jones and Veld (2007) define “moneyness” as the ratio of “S/K”, the 
“current stock price/ the conversion price”, which is the inverse of Kuhlman and   21
Radcliffe (1992)’s definition, measuring the potentials that managers motivate CB 
holders to convert soon after the issuances.  
 
Lower value of “moneyness” indicates larger distance between the current stock price and 
the conversion price, and thus the CB is viewed as more debt-like. 
 
3.2.2 Expected Time to Becoming At-the-money 
 
Unlike “moneyness”, which merely contrasts the current stock price with the conversion 
price, Davidson, Glascock and Schwartz (1995) put forward a measurement of the 
“expected time to becoming at-the-money”, which take into consideration the growth rate 
of the issuer’s stock price appreciation. The shorter the expected time to becoming at-the-
money is, the more equity-like the CB is.  
 
Assume that the CB’s underlying stock price follows geometric Brownian motion, 
t t t dW dt S dS σ μ + = / , where the drift parameter μ   measures is the expected rate of 
appreciation of the issuer’s stock price and σ  is the stock volatility, the expected stock 
price at a future time t is  ) ( t S E =
t e S
μ
0 , where  0 S  is the present stock price.  
 
The estimated time to becoming at-the-money, denoted as “Time”, is then derived by 
estimating μ  and  setting t S =K and  0 S =S, where “K”  and “S” are defined as above. 
Therefore, Time = [ln(K)-ln(S)]/μ . 
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3.2.3 Conversion Probability 
 
Another way of measuring the relative equity component is to estimate the CB’s 
conversion probability, which is roughly regarded as the probability that the CB becomes 
at-the-money (or in-the-money) by the time of the final maturity. 
 
Janjigian (1987) assumed that the underlying stock prices are lognormally distributed and 
the logarithm of the prices are normally distributed, and then he estimated the probability 
of conversion to be equal to )
) ln( ) ln(
(
T
S K
N
σ
−
, where “K”, “S”, and σ  are defined to be 
the same as above, and T is the remaining time to maturity.  
 
Lewis, Rogalski and Seward (1999) equated CBs with European call options on the 
issuers’ outstanding common equities, with the strike prices equal to the CBs’ conversion 
prices. By assuming that the stock prices follow geometric Brownian motion, 
t t t dW dt S dS σ μ + = / , they proxied the probability that the CB get converted by the end 
of the maturity as p = ) ( 2 d N , where 
T
T d r K S
d
σ
σ ) 2 / ( ) / ln(
2
1
− − +
= , which is derived 
from the modified version of Black-Scholes option pricing model.  
 
3.2.4 Hedge Ratio 
 
Assume that the call warrant in CB is the only portion that is affected by changes in the 
stock price, the change in the value of CB due to a change in the stock price is measured 
by the hedge ratio delta, Δ , which reflects the sensitivity of CB to the issuer’s   23
outstanding common equity. Using replicate portfolio technique, the payoff from holding 
a unit of CB can be obtained by holding Δ units of the underlying stock and borrowing 
an amount of cash up to B, such that CB=ΔS+B.  
 
Under the modified Black-Scholes option pricing framework, Δ equals to  ) ( 1 d N e
dT − , 
where
T
T d r K S
d
σ
σ ) 2 / ( ) / ln(
2
1
+ − +
= , and the input variables are the same as those for 
computing the conversion probability “p” in Lewis, Rogalski and Seward (1999).  
 
Burlacu (2000) was the first to employ the hedge ratioΔ to divide the whole sample of 
CBs into different subsamples with different proportions of relative equity components. 
This measurement has also been applied by Ammann, Fehr and Seiz (2006) and 
Loncarski, Horst and Veld (2006) to analyze subsamples of CBs.  
 
3.3 Comparison among Various Measurements of Equity Components 
 
Both the issuers’ current stock prices (S) and the conversion prices (K) are directly 
observable by the time the CBs are offered, therefore “moneyness”, which merely base on 
S and K, is the easiest to compute. But the weakness in “moneyness” is apparent, since it 
does not take into account effects other than the distance between the current stock price 
and the conversion price. Also we notice that the effect of “moneyness” is incorporated in 
the other variables introduced above.  
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The expected time to becoming at-the-money, “Time”, is superior to “moneyness” in that 
it includes the growth rates of the underlying stock prices (μ ). But the major difficulty in 
computing “Time” is the estimation of μ , which is not directly observable. The 
conversion probability defined in Janjigian (1987) is also superior to “moneyness” by 
adding the effects of the volatility of the underlying stock returns (σ ) and CB’s time to 
maturity (T).  
 
The conversion probability (p) introduced by Lewis, Rogalski and Seward (1999) and the 
hedge ratioΔ are both derived from the modified Black-Scholes model, which not only 
incorporate the effect of “moneyness”, but also covers the effects of the issuer’s dividend 
policy (d), the volatility of the underlying stock return (σ ), as well as the time to 
maturity (T). The dividend policy is useful because the investors need to compare the 
coupon rate of a CB with the issuer’s dividend payouts when deciding whether to convert 
the CB into equities, and the volatility of the underlying stock returns is also important 
because higher volatility indicates a higher probability that the stock price surpasses the 
conversion price within a given period of time, rendering the CB to be more equity-like.  
 
Because of the wide coverage of input variables, “p” and Δ are superior to “moneyness” 
and “Time”. However, we notice that “p”, which is derived under the risk neutral 
probability measure, may not reflect the true probability that the investors convert CBs 
into equities. The returns by investing in CBs equal to the risk-free rate of return (r) 
under the risk neutral probability measure, but in reality what the investors require are 
more than the risk-free rate of return (r) due to the risks involved. A correct conversion   25
probability should be derived under the true probability measure (Derivation for a 
corrected conversion probability under the modified Black-Scholes framework is given in 
the Appendix I).  
 
By comparison, we therefore recommend the use of Δ as a preferable measurement of 
the relative equity components in CBs, and in this paper we employ Δ as the criterion to 
divide the whole sample of CBs into different subsamples. Besides, we also compute 
“moneyness” and the expected time to becoming at-the-money, “Time”, as references. 
The “Time” used here is a little different from that in Davidson, Glascock and Schwartz 
(1995), where we assume a continuous compounded rate of stock price appreciation
2, and 
“moneyness” is modified from that of Yu (2005)’s and Zabolotnyuk, Jones and Veld 
(2007)’s to be equal to (S-K)/K. 
 
4. Data and Sample Description 
 
4.1 Data 
 
4.1.1 Data Sources 
 
Our initial sample consists of all the CB issuances on the US market from 1976 to 2006, 
which is obtained from the Securities Data Company (SDC Platinum) global new issues 
database
3. The information for CB issuers’ stock prices and stock returns are obtained 
                                                 
2 We also computed the “expected time to becoming at-the-money” in exactly the way introduced by 
Davidson, Glascock and Schwarz (1995), where the expected rate of stock price appreciation is not 
continuously compounded, and we find that the results do not differ very much. The modification of 
“moneyness” also does not change the results qualitatively from using “S/K” directly as in Yu (2005) etc. 
3 The SDC global new issue database report the records for convertible bond issuances started from 1970, 
but the complete data descriptions started from 1976.   26
from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) daily returns and monthly returns 
files. The issuers’ financial data are obtained from Standard & Poor's COMPUSTAT 
Industrial annual database. We also referred to DataStream for the daily US treasure 
constant maturities 10 year-middle rate, the International Brokers Estimate System (IBES) 
database for the estimation of the issuers’ EPS growth rate, and the Lexis-Nexis for 
manual collation of each of the announcement date of CB issuances.  
 
4.1.2 Data Selection 
 
The SDC global new issues database reports 1733 CB issuances over the period from 
1976 to 2006, and the raw data from SDC are then processed by the following steps.  
 
Firstly, we follow the literatures to exclude the issuers from the regulated utilities 
industry, the financial institutions, and their holding companies, whose capital structure 
arrangements and market reactions are found to be different from industrial companies. 
The issuers’ industries are identified by their 3-digit Standard Industry Classification 
codes (SIC codes). The utility industry has SIC codes equal to 481, 491, 492, 493, and 
494, and the financial industry has SIC codes from 600 to 699. This step reduces the 
sample to be 1319 observations.  
 
Secondly, we exclude the CB issuance observations whose initiators do not have 
outstanding equities’ information over a [-250, 250] days’ window in CRSP daily returns 
file. This step further reduces the sample size to be 977 observations.  
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Thirdly, we manually collate the announcement date of each CB issuance by comparing 
the SDC “filing date” with the announcements in Lexis-Nexis dataset
4. The SDC “filing 
date” is the date on which a company files a registration statement with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), which can be roughly taken as the announcement date of a 
CB issuance. But due to the sensitivity of an event study to the event dates, we refer to 
the Lexis-Nexis dataset to guarantee a more accurate date of the announcement of CB 
issuance. 8 more observations are deleted either because their SDC “filing dates” are not 
verified by information in the Lexis-Nexis dataset or because the issuers announced 
multiple CB issuances on one day. After this step, the sample contains 969 observations, 
which constitute the sample for short-run event study.  
 
For the purpose of a long-run analysis, where we examine the annual performance of CB 
issuers’ over [-3, 3] years, a 7-year sample period centered on the year of CB issuances, 
we need to further eliminate the issuers that do not have financial data reported in 
COMPUSTAT within the [-3, 3] years’ widow. This step reduces the sample size to be 
726 observations
5 . One more problem confronting the long-run analysis is the 
overlapping issuances that are observed within the same event window. Some firms are 
found to have multiple issuances within one year or during years that are very close to 
one another, and the inclusion of overlapping issuances will lead to bias. In order to 
circumvent this problem and maintain accuracy in the post-issuance long run analysis, for 
                                                 
4  We use 2 files of Lexis-Nexis, namely, the “
Major Newspapers”
 and the “
Wire Service Stories”
. “
Major 
Newspapers”
 include US newspapers that are listed in the top 50 circulation in Editor & Publisher Year Book, such as 
the New York Times and the Washington Post, and the newspapers published outside the US are listed in Benn's World 
Media directory or one of the top 5% in circulation for the country. The “
Wire services”
 group file contains all 
newswires from the ALLNWS group file. 
 
5 Two observations are deleted because of inconsistent data reported in COMPUSTAT.   28
each issuer we retain its first issuance in the whole sample period (corresponding to year 
0) and delete all the issuances that occur within the (0, 3] years’ window. When a second 
issuance is retained, similar procedure is applied to eliminate issuance observations 
within (0, 3] of this second one. Finally, we have a clean sample of 619 observations for 
the long-run analysis.  
 
4.2 Sample Description 
 
4.2.1 Whole Sample of Convertible Bond Issuances 
 
Table 1 describes the yearly distribution for CB issuances over the year 1976 to 2006, 
and Figure 1.1 displays the annual CB issuances in terms of frequency throughout the 31 
years
6. We notice that during the bearish period of the stock market in the 1970s, only 
few firms issued CBs, and as the stock market gradually revived in the 1980s, the number 
of CB issuances saw a large increase. The CB issuance activity peaked in the mid 1980s, 
and thereafter it remained at a relatively stable level. This trend is very similar to the SEO 
activity as reported in Loughran and Ritter (1997). Figure 1.2 describes the dollar amount 
of CB issuances measured by gross proceeds, from which we notice that the annual 
issuance amount is increasing. 
 
[Insert Table 1, Table 2, Figure 1 and Figure 2 Here] 
 
Table 2 and Figure 2 describe the industry distribution of CB issuances in the form of a 
table and a pie chart. In comparison with the industry distribution of SEOs in Loughran 
                                                 
6 The reported sample has 969 observations, which constitute the sample of our short-run study. The 
information for the sample of long-run analysis is qualitatively the same, and thus the report is omitted.    29
and Ritter (1997)’s, we find that the industries on the top of the CB issuance frequency 
list are the same as the top industries that initiate SEOs. The top six industries make up 
81.26% of all the CB issuances in the past three decades.  
 
4.2.2 Subsampling Criterion 
 
We employ the hedge ratioΔ, derived from the modified Black-Scholes option pricing 
model, as the subsampling criterion. Δ measures the sensitivity of CBs to the issuers’ 
outstanding equities, which is defined as:  
 
                                  Δ =  }
) 2 / ( ) / ln(
{
2
T
T d r K S
N e
dT
σ
σ + − + − ,                             (5) 
 
where N{ } is CDF of standard normal distribution, and the input variables are:  
 
i)  The current stock price (S), estimated by the average stock price in the 2 weeks 
prior to the CB issuance announcement, that is [-15,-6] trading days relative the 
issuance announcement date (day 0); 
 
ii)  The conversion price (K), obtained directly from SDC;  
 
iii)  The annualized continuously compounded risk free rate on the date of the CB 
issuance announcement (r), estimated using the daily US treasure constant   30
maturities 10 year-middle rate reported by DataStream, and then converted into a 
continuously compounded form
7;  
 
iv)  The annualized continuously compounded dividend yield of CB issuer (d), 
computed as the ratio of the issuer’s ex-date dividends per share (COMPUSTAT 
data item 26) / Fiscal year close price (COMPUSTAT data item 199) 
immediately prior to the year of the issuance and then transferred into a 
continuously compounded form;  
 
v)  The annualized volatility of the issuer’s continuous compounded log stock 
returns (σ ), which is calculated using the [-240, -40] days’ historical stock price 
data from CRSP
8;  
 
vi)  The time to maturity (T), calculated as the number of years between the “final 
maturity” (obtained from SDC) and the year of the CB issuance.  
 
The distribution of the estimated Δ is displayed in Figure 3, and the summary statistics 
for Δ are reported in Table 3.1. Δ ranges from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 1, with 
a mean of 0.7627. The higher the value ofΔ, the more equity-like the CB is. When Δ 
approaches 1, the CB can be viewed as quasi-equity, and as Δ approaches 0, it can be 
viewed as quasi-debt.  
 
                                                 
7 The US treasure constant maturities 10 year-middle rate reported in DataStream is already in annualized 
form, on a 360 days per year basis. 
8 Annualized on a 252 trading day basis.    31
[Insert Table 3 and Figure 3 Here] 
 
By setting aside the observations where Δ are calculated as missing (corresponding to 
174 observations), the whole sample of CB issuances is then divided into 3 subsample 
portfolios, the debt-like portfolio, the mixed portfolio, and the equity portfolio, with equal 
sizes of 265 CB issuance observations. Summary statistics for the subsamples CBs are 
reported in Table 3.2. The debt-like portfolio consists of CBs with the least proportions of 
equity components (averageΔ= 0.456), the equity-like portfolio consist of CBs with the 
most proportions of equity components (average Δ = 0.974), and the mixed portfolio 
consists of CBs with undistinguishable components of equity and debt (average Δ = 
0.859). The mixed portfolio itself is not a subject of interest because of the ambiguous 
information it signals, but the introduction of it allows us to better focus on the 2 extreme 
portfolios. 
 
The other three measurements of the equity components in CBs, “moneyness”, “Time”, 
and “conversion probability” are also computed and reported.  
 
                                                   moneyness = (S-K)/K                                                     (6) 
                                                 Time = [ln(K)-ln(S)]/μ                                                   (7) 
Pr =N (
T
T K St
σ
σ μ ) 2 / ( ) / ln(
2 − +
)                                         (8) 
where S and K are defined and calculated the same as those in computing Δ, and μ  is 
the estimated growth rate of the issuer’s EPS. Following Davidson, Glascock and 
Schwartz (1995), we proxy μ  using  the  “Estimated  Five-year Growth Rate-Median”   32
obtained from the IBES tapes, which is the expected average annual growth rate over 5 
years subsequent to the CB issuance, and then we convert it into a continuously 
compounded version.  
 
As shown in Table 3.1, “moneyness” ranges from -0.8454 to 11.3733 with a mean of -
0.1075. Negative values of “moneyness” correspond to out-of-the-money CB issuances 
and positive values of “moneyness” correspond to in-the-money CB issuances. CBs that 
are offered deep out-of-the-money tend to be more debt-like. We notice that 848 out of 
the 960 CBs are offered out-of-the-money, 120 CBs are offered in-the-money, and 1 CB 
is offered exactly at-the-money. Because of the existence of in-the-money and at-the-
money CB issuances, when computing “Time”, the expected time to becoming at-the-
money, we set those “Time” which are calculated as negative to be 0
9. Table 3.1 shows 
that the maximum “Time” is 243.39 years, with an average value of 1.82 years and a 
standard deviation of 10.43, indicating that “Time” is very volatile.  
 
From Table 3.2 we see that the average “moneyness” of the debt-like portfolio, the mixed 
portfolio, and the equity-like portfolio are -0.094, -0.149, and -0.083, respectively, and 
the average “Time” of the debt-like portfolio, the mixed portfolio, and the equity-like 
portfolio are 3.315 years, 1.277 years, and 1.013 years, respectively.  
 
                                                 
9 By setting the value of Time to be 0 for all the in-the-money issuances, we find that the statistical 
significance of Time in explaining the announcement effect becomes a little smaller than if we do not (as in 
Davidson, Glascock, and Schwarz, 1995). But this change does not affect the qualitative result, and we 
maintain it because this allows us to better reflect the reality.    33
Also shown in Table 3 are summary statistics for the input elements in computingΔ. 
They are volatility, dividend yield, risk free rate, current stock price, and time to maturity. 
The Pearson correlation coefficients between Δ , “moneyness”, and “Time” are also 
reported. Δ and “moneyness” are positively correlated with a correlation coefficient of 
2.53%, and “Time” is negatively correlated with both Δ and “moneyness”.  
 
4.2.3 Differences of Characteristics of Subsample Portfolios 
 
The differences among subsample CB portfolios are examined and reported in Table 4. 
We notice that although the other two measurements of equity components, “moneyness” 
and “Time”,  exhibit differences among subsample portfolios, the differences are not 
significant under the 10% level.  
 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
 
All of the variables that characterize a specific CB issuance (the conversion price K, the 
current stock price S, the dividend yield d, the stock volatility σ , the time to maturity T, 
the coupon rate, and the issue size) are significantly different between the debt-like 
portfolio and the equity-like portfolio, except for the dividend yield d. Moreover, we 
notice that although both the conversion price K and the current price S of the debt-like 
portfolio are significantly higher than that of the equity-like portfolio, they are in fact 
positively correlated with each others, which may be the reason why  “moneyness” do not 
differ significantly between these two portfolios. The outstanding shares of the debt-like 
portfolio have higher dividend yield and lower volatility. Also, the CBs in the debt-like   34
portfolio are designed to have shorter time to maturity, lower coupon rates, and larger 
issue sizes.  
 
The characteristics of issuers from different subsample portfolios also exhibit some 
differences. First, the issuers that offer debt-like CBs are of larger firm scales, 
characterized by having the highest total assets and market value of equity (MVE). The 
issuers that offer equity-like CBs, in contrast, are small firms with the fewest assets and 
the lowest MVE. Second, both the common shares outstanding and the debt in current 
liabilities are higher of the debt-like portfolio than that of the equity-portfolio, but they 
may be correlated with the effects of the firm scale because the financial leverage do not 
differ significantly between them. Third, companies that offer debt-like CBs have more 
sales and higher earnings, while they incur higher R&D expenditures and higher capital 
expenditures. Notice, however, when we the expenses are scaled by total assets, we find 
that the equity-like portfolio have significantly higher relative expenditures. Fourth, firms 
from the equity-like portfolio are supposed to have higher growth opportunities, because 
all the indices indicating growth opportunities, such as the median estimate of the growth 
rate of EPS,μ , the market to book ratio (M/B), and the Tobin’s Q ratio of the equity-like 
portfolio are all higher than that of the debt-like portfolio.  
 
5. Main Findings 
 
5.1 Short-run Announcement Effects of Convertible Bond Issuances 
 
5.1.1 Methodology of Short-run Event Study   35
 
In order to capture the short-run announcement effects of CB issuances, we first apply the 
event study methodology to compute the announcement period abnormal stock returns 
for the whole sample and subsamples, respectively.  
 
The announcement period abnormal stock returns (also referred to as “prediction errors” 
in some literatures) are estimated using the market model. At time-t, the market model for 
the i-th CB issuer is  
 
                                                   t i t m i i t i R R , , , ε β α + + =                                                    (9) 
 
where t i R ,  is the time-t return for the i-th issuer’s outstanding equity and  t m R ,  is the time-
t return of the market.  ) ( , t i E ε = 0 and  ) ( ,t i Var ε =
2
, t i ε σ .  
 
The data of daily stock returns in the [-250, -50] days’ window are used to estimate the 
parameters of the market model. The input data are obtained from the CRSP daily return 
file, and  t m R ,  is proxied by the CRSP valued-weight NYSE/AMES/Nasdaq index return.  
 
Mackinlay (1997) pointed out that although other multifactor models or economics 
models, such as the CAPM and APT, are also available to estimate the stock returns with 
perhaps better forecast abilities, the market model is sufficient to capture the event period   36
abnormal stock returns. Also, he showed that the OLS estimators of the market model are 
consistent and efficient, which are estimated to be:  
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The abnormal stock returns are thus computed as the market model residuals: 
 
                                                  t i AR , = t m i i t i R R , , ˆ ˆ β α − −                                                    (12) 
 
Under the null hypothesis that the announcements of CB issuances has no impact on the 
stock returns,  t i AR ,  are jointly normally distributed with a conditional mean equal to zero 
and the conditional variance is ⎟
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We compute the announcement period abnormal stock returns over several different 
event windows one week before the issuance announcement until one week after it. The   37
cumulative abnormal return, CAR ) , ( 2 1 t t , is defined as the sum of abnormal returns of 
from  1 t  to  2 t  relative to the issuance announcement date (date 0). For example, CAR (-2, 
2) =∑ − =
2
2 , t t i AR . The average cumulative abnormal return ACAR ) , ( 2 1 t t  is defined as the 
average of the CAR across n observations.  
 
Under the null hypothesis of no announcement effect, CAR ) , ( 2 1 t t ~ N (0,
2
1 2 ) 1 (
i t t ε σ + − ), 
and ACAR ) , ( 2 1 t t ~ N (0, 
2
1
2
1 2 / ) 1 ( n t t
n
i i ∑ = + − ε σ ).  
 
Four different test statistics, namely, the ordinary cross-sectional t statistics, the 
standardized cross-sectional t statistics, the nonparametric sign-test statistics, and the 
GARCH-based test statistics, are applied to measure the statistical significance of the 
abnormal stock returns. 
 
The ordinary cross-sectional test assumes that the abnormal returns are cross-sectionally 
independent and allows for event-induced variance changes. The test statistics from 
ordinary cross-sectional test is defined as:  
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The standardized cross-sectional test is developed by Boehmer et al (1991), which 
incorporates information from both the estimation period and the event period. The event 
period abnormal returns are first standardized by the estimation period standard deviation. 
The test statistics is defined as: 
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where
2
1 2 2 1 , ) ( / ) , (
t i t t t t CAR SR i i ε σ − = . 
 
The nonparametric sign test also assumes abnormal stock returns to be cross-sectionally 
independent, but it does not require specific assumptions on the distribution of abnormal 
returns. Denote 
+ n  as the number of observations with positive abnormal stock return, 
and the statistics is: 
 
                                                       t = 
n
n n
/ 25 . 0
) 5 . 0 / ( −
+
                                                       (15) 
 
The GARCH-based test statistic is introduced to accommodate the event-induced return 
volatilities, which are found to bias the performances of the traditional test statistics. 
Basing on the GARCH (1,1) model, the relationship between the return of equity i and 
the market return is model by (16).  
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                                              t i t i t m i i t i D R R , , , η γ β α + ⋅ + ⋅ + =                                         (16) 
 
t D  is an indicator variable which takes a value of 1 if date t is an event day, and 0 
otherwise. The conditional distribution of the error terms  t i, η  is assumed to be standard 
normal,  ) , 0 ( ~ | , , t i t t i h N Ω η , where  t Ω  denotes the set of information available by date t. 
The conditional variance is modeled by: 
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The test statistics t can be formulated as: 
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where  t i i i h S , ˆ / ˆ γ = . Savickas (2003) shows that the above statistic has a higher power 
in detecting abnormal returns than the traditional tests statistics when event induce 
volatilities, which also has an appropriate size.  
 
5.1.2 Results and Discussions 
 
The results of average abnormal stock returns (AAR) and average cumulative abnormal 
returns (ACAR) are reported in Table 5 for the whole sample and the subsamples 
portfolios. 
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[Insert Table 5 Here] 
 
From Table 5 we notice that there are a few positive abnormal stock returns before and 
after the issuance announcements, but on exactly the day of announcements and days 
closely next to the announcements, the abnormal stock returns are all negative. The days 
with significantly negative abnormal stock returns are found in the [-1, 1] window. The 
cumulative abnormal stock returns over all the reported windows are significantly 
negative, suggesting that the announcement effect on a cumulative basis is more robust. 
As the window expands around the announcement date, however, the negative stock 
returns become less significant.  
 
Table 5.1 also displays the AAR and ACAR for subsample portfolios. The differences in 
AAR among the subsamples are evident. During the days before the issuers’ issuance 
announcements, the debt-like portfolio experienced a few days of significantly positive 
abnormal stock returns, while a similar behavior is not observed in either of the other 2 
portfolios. On the date of the issuance announcements, all of the 3 portfolios suffered 
from significantly negative market reactions, while the degree of the reaction to the debt-
like portfolio is the lowest (-0.0077) comparing with the equity-like portfolio (-0.0110) 
and the mixed portfolio (-0.0129). For the debt-like portfolio, the significantly negative 
market reaction appeared one day prior to the issuance announcement, and then from the 
second day after the issuance the stock returns rebounded back to non-negative. The 
significantly negative market reactions to the other 2 portfolios occurred exactly on the 
date of the issuance announcements, and the returns of the equity-like portfolio did not 
bounce back into positive subsequent to the issuances.   41
 
The ACAR for the 3 subsample portfolios are all significantly negative over our reported 
windows alike, but we notice that the degree of negative market reactions is strictly 
monotonically decreasing from the debt-like portfolio, through the mixed portfolio, to the 
equity-like portfolio. The ACAR (-2, 2), which is computed by summing up the abnormal 
returns one week around the issuance announcement, is -0.0136 for the debt-like portfolio, 
-0.0224 for the mixed portfolio, and -0.0269 for the equity-like portfolio. Also, the 
significance of the announcement effect, measured by the standardized cross sectional t 
statistics, is lower for the debt-like portfolio. All the findings are in support of the 
pecking order hypothesis that the equity-components signal more negative information to 
the market. 
 
The testing results of differences in ACAR between pair-wised subsamples are reported 
in Table5.2, where we notice a strict hierarchy of pecking order (the negative market 
reactions to the equity-like portfolio are the most severe and the reactions to the debt-like 
portfolio are the slightest) except for the (0, 1) day window, when the most severe 
negative market reaction is found in the mixed portfolio.  
 
Table 5.3 reports the result by regressing the announcement effect, measured by CAR (-2, 
2), on hedge ratio Δ, from which we see that Δ is significantly and negatively related to 
the announcement effects (the slope coefficient is -0.2287 and the New-West 
heteroskedasticity consistent t statistic is -2.16).  
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5.2 Long-run Stock Return Performances 
 
The efficiency of the stock market has long been questioned, casting doubt on the ability 
of the market to absorb all the information and make a full reaction in the short-run. 
Therefore a long-run analysis provides a better view into the effects of CB issuances. 
Lewis, Rogalski and Seward (2001) studied into the [-5, 5] years’ long run performance 
of CB issuances between 1979 and 1990 in the US market, and their results show that the 
differences in performances between the CB issuers and the non-issuers became 
insignificant since the fourth year after the CB issuance. In our analysis, we hence 
examine the long-run performances [-3, 3] years around the CB issuances. Our whole 
sample for the long-run analysis consists of 620 CB issuance observations
10 over 1976 to 
2006. 
 
We intend to test the hypotheses that 1) the stock returns of the equity-like portfolio 
significantly reduced from the pre issuance period to the post issuance period, and 2) in 
the post issuance period, returns from the equity-like portfolio underperform that of the 
debt-like portfolio.  
 
5.2.1 Comparison of the Pre and Post Issuance Stock Returns 
 
A. Long-run buy-and-hold stock returns 
 
                                                 
10 We have also studied into a [-5, 5] period long-run operating performance of CB issuers and find the 
similar diminishment in issuance impact since the fourth year after the issuance.    43
The long-run stock return performance is measured by the holding period buy and hold 
returns (BHR). We follow Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2000) to define BHR for portfolio j 
with n equities components over a holding period from  1 T  to 2 T  as:  
 
                                        j BHR ∑ ∏ = = − + ≡
n
i
T
T t t i i R
1 , ] 1 ) 1 ( [
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1 ω                                         (19) 
 
where ∑ = =
n
i i i i MVE MVE
1 / ω  for a value-weighted (V.W.) portfolio and  n i / 1 = ω  for an 
equal-weighed (E.W.) portfolio.  
 
The CRSP monthly return file is referred to as a source of returns t i R , . If a stock is 
delisted from the market before the end of the [-3, 3] years’ window, then the holding 
period is calculated till the time when it is delisted. The abnormal performances are then 
measured by the differences between the CB issuers’ BHR and the benchmarks’ BHR, 
denoted as diff.. Two benchmarks are applied here. One is the non-issuing matching firms 
which are identified as what Lewis, Rogalski and Seward (2001) introduced, and the 
other one is the CRSP index, the data for which are also obtained from CRSP monthly 
return file. A detailed statement of how a non-issuing matching firm is identified for each 
CB issuer is given in next subsection (section 5.3).  
 
Both the value-weighted and the equal-weighted portfolios are constructed, for value-
weighted portfolios, the benchmarks are also value-weighted, and for equal-weighted   44
portfolios, the benchmarks are also equal-weighted. The [-3, 3] years’ buy and hold 
returns and the abnormal returns are reported in Table 6.1.  
 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
 
During the pre-issuance [-3, 0] years’ period, all the E.W. CB issuers outperformed their 
benchmarks at 1% significance levels, except for the E.W. debt-like portfolio which only 
insignificantly outperformed the matching firms. The results when using the V.W. 
portfolios are virtually the same, but the outperformances of the CB issuers’ stock returns 
became less significant. This phenomenon is consistent with Brav et al. (1995), Mitchell 
and Stafford (1998), Loughran and Ritter (2000), and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1999), 
who found insignificant long-run abnormal stock returns when using value-weighted 
portfolios. Loughran and Ritter (2000) argued that tests based on value-weighted returns 
have low power to detect economically significant abnormal performance when the 
abnormal performance is expected to be more severe among smaller firms. Spiess and 
Affleck-Graves (1999) claimed that the choice of equal-weighted or value-weighted 
portfolios is an issue of perspective rather than one of methodological correctness. When 
measuring the aggregate wealth effects experienced by investors, the value-weighting is 
appropriate. If the perspective is to measure the abnormal returns of a typical firm 
undergoing a particular event, then equal-weighting is appropriate.  
 
In the 3 years subsequent to the CB issuances, returns from almost all the portfolios 
underperform that of the benchmarks. Using both value-weighting and equal-weighting, 
the underperformances experienced by the equity-like portfolio were the most significant   45
and severe. On the other hand, the underperformance of the debt-like portfolio was not 
significant using either value-weighting or equal-weighting.  
 
B. Fama French three factor model  
 
In examining the port-issuance long-term abnormal stock return of the issuers, we also 
apply Fama and French (1993) three-factor regression model to construct calendar-time 
portfolios, which controls for cross-sectional dependence.  
 
               ) ( ) ( ) ( )] ( ) ( [ ) ( ) ( t t hHML t sSMB t RF t RM t RF t R ε β α + + + − + = −                   (20) 
 
The Fama French three factor regression model takes a form of (16), where we form 383 
monthly portfolios from February, 1976 to December, 2007 for the whole sample CB 
issuance observations. In order to be parallel with the other part of the paper, which 
examine [-3, 3] years’ long-run performances of the issuers, we modify the portfolio 
selection period to be 36 months, so that R(t) is the return of month-t portfolio which is 
the weighted stock returns by all issuers that offered CBs in the past 36 months. RF(t) is 
risk-free rate at month-t, RM(t) is the NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ value-weighted stock 
return in month-t, SMB(t) is the return on small firms minus the return on large firms in 
month-t, HML(t) is the return on high book-to-market stock returns minus the low book-
to-market stock returns in month-t,  ) (t ε   is the disturbance. Thus, the intercept 
α describes the abnormal stock return of the month-t portfolio.  
 
[Insert Table 7 Here]   46
 
Again we construct the portfolios using both equal weighting and value weighting. 
Denote the number of companies included in each time series portfolio as n and  t ω  is the 
weight for it, so that where ∑ = =
n
t t t t MVE MVE
1 / ω  for a value-weighted (V.W.) portfolio 
and  n t / 1 = ω  for an equal-weighed (E.W.) portfolio. The number of companies in the 
383 time series portfolios ranges from a maximum of 170 to a minimum of 1. Table 7.1 
presents the result whole sample long-run stock returns. We notice that when using equal-
weighted portfolio, the stock returns are significantly negative when we use both ordinary 
least squares (OLS) and weight least squares (WLS), the weight of which equals the 
number of companies in the monthly portfolios. However, when using value-weighted 
portfolio, the stock returns are insignificantly positive.  
 
We also run the three factor regressions for each of the three sub-sample portfolios, 
respectively. There are 383 monthly bond-like portfolios from February, 1976 to 
December, 2007, with a maximum of 45 companies per portfolio to a minimum of 1 
company in each portfolio. There are 382 monthly mixed portfolios from March, 1976 to 
December, 2007, with a maximum of 38 companies per portfolio to a minimum of 1 
company in each portfolio. There are 342 discontinuous monthly equity-like portfolios 
from June, 1976 to December, 2007, with a maximum of 84 companies per portfolio to a 
minimum of 1 company in each portfolio. The results for subsample portfolios are 
reported in Table 7.2. We see that the abnormal stock returns for the equal-weighed debt-
like portfolio are significantly negative when using both ordinary least square and weight 
least square. When value weighted, the negative abnormal stock return becomes   47
insignificant using ordinary least square and the abnormal stock return becomes 
insignificantly positive when using weight least square. For the mixed CB issuances, the 
abnormal stock returns are negative when equal weighted and positive when value 
weighted. The abnormal stock return for the stock-like portfolios are all negative both 
equal weighted and value weighted, but the negative abnormal stock return is only 
significant when using weight least square.  
 
5.2.2 Comparison of Long-run Stock Returns among Subsample Portfolios 
 
Table 6.2 compares the average stock returns of the debt-like portfolio and the equity-like 
portfolios around the CB issuances. During the pre issuance [-3, 0] years’ period, the 
stock returns of the equity-like portfolio significantly outperformed that of the debt-like 
portfolio’s at a 10% significance level when valued-weighted and at a 5% significance 
level when both are equally-weighted. During the post issuance 3 years, the condition is 
reversed, and the equity-like portfolio significantly underperforms the debt-like portfolio 
at a 1% significance level when both of them are equal-weighted, although the 
underperformance is insignificant when they are value-weighted.  
 
The results in Table 7.2 report the post-issuance long-run abnormal stock returns for 
subsample portfolios using three factor regression technique , from which we see that the 
negative abnormal stock return of the equity-like portfolio is always more severe than 
that of the debt-like portfolio either equal-weighted or value-weighted and regardless of 
using ordinary least square or weight least square.  
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5.3 Long-run Operating Performances 
 
The stock return performances tend to be reflections of the issuers’ operating 
performances. We then examine the [-3, 3] years’ operating performances of the CB 
issuers’, and we intend to test the hypotheses that over a post issuance long-run period, 1) 
the companies that offered equity-like CBs experience a more severe deterioration in 
their operating performances, and 2) they underperform companies that offered debt-like 
CBs.  
 
5.3.1 Comparison of Pre and Post Issuance Operating Performance 
 
In literatures, there is no one indicator of operating performance regarded as most 
preferable. McLaughlin, Safieddine, and Vasudevan (1998) and Barber and Lyon (1996) 
used pre-tax operating cash flows, Hansen and Crutchley (1990) used earnings before 
interest and taxes, and Loughran and Ritter (1997) used ROA, OIBD/Assets, etc.  
 
We follow Loughran and Ritter (1997) and measure the companies’ operating 
performances by OIBD/Assets, which is defined by dividing the sum of operating income 
before depreciation and interest rate by total assets
11. OIBD/Assets is a measurement of 
the cash flow operating performance which provides evidence on the efficient utilization 
and profitability of the companies’ assets-in-place.  
 
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
 
                                                 
11 OIBD/Assets =(COMPUSTAT data item 13+ COMPUSTAT data item 62)*100/ COMPUSTAT data 
item 6   49
Table 8.1 lists the raw operating performance for the whole sample and the subsample 
portfolios. When viewed as a whole, the CB issuers experienced a decline in their 
operating performances from the pre-issuance period to the post-issuance period. The 
average (median) pre-issuance operating performance is 12.312 (14.429), which is much 
higher than the post-issuance operating performance of 10.559 (12.271)
12. The change in 
the mean (median) operating performance from the pre-issuance period to the post-
issuance period is significant at a 5% (1%) level. Although we find a deterioration in the 
median CB issuer’s post-issuance operating performance, which is similar to Lewis, 
Rogalski and Seward (2001), we do not observe a similar improvement in the median 
issuer’s operating performance during the 3 years prior to the issuance, as Lewis, 
Rogalski and Seward (2001) reported.  
 
By viewing into the results from a subsampling perspective, the mean (median) operating 
performance declined from the pre-issuance period to the post-issuance period for all the 
subsamples alike. The degree of operating performance deterioration exhibits a pecking 
order hierarchy where the equity-like portfolio went through the largest degree of 
performance deterioration and the debt-like portfolio experienced the slightest degree of 
performance deterioration. Although the median pre and post issuance changes for all the 
3 subsamples are significant when using Wilcoxon signed-rank test, the change in 
average operating performances are neither significant for the debt-like portfolio nor 
significant for the mixed portfolio.  
 
                                                 
12 The year of CB issuance is year 0, which is neither include in the pre-issuance period [-3, -1], nor 
included in the post-issuance period [1, 3].   50
We are concerned with how much the industry-wide factors affect the issuers’ 
performances, so we remove the industry effects before assessing the issuers’ abnormal 
performances. For each of the 620 CB issuers in our sample for long-run analysis, we 
find its non-issuing counterpart basing on similarities in industry affiliation, asset size, 
and normalized operating income, and then we compute the issuers’ abnormal 
performances by subtracting the matching firms’ OIBD/Asset from the issuers’ realized 
OIBD/Assets.   
 
Specifically, we follow the same procedure which Lewis, Rogalski and Seward (2001) 
introduced in finding a non-issuing matching firm for each CB issuer. 
 
Step 1: Select all the firms which are in the same industry of each issuer’s 
(according to the issuer’s the two-digit SIC code) and have stock information 
reported in CRSP and financial information reported in COMPUSTAT.  
 
Step 2: Retain the candidates whose end-of-year assets are within 25% to 200% of 
that of the issuer’s, and then the one with the closest OIBD/Assets ratio to that of the 
issuer’s is chosen as the matching firm.  
 
Step 3: If no non-issuer meets the criterion above, then all non-issuers with year 0 
assets of 90% to 110% of the issuer’s are ranked, and then the one with the closest, 
but higher, OIBD/Assets ratio is selected as the matching firm.  
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Table 8.2 reports the results for the issuers’ abnormal operating performances in terms of 
mean and median. The CB issuers are observed to outperform their matching firms 
during a few temporary years prior to the issuances, whereas during the whole post-
issuance period the issuers underperform their matching firms. From the first two 
columns, we notice that the changes in mean and median abnormal operating 
performances from the pre-issuance period to the post-issuance period are significant 
under the 5% and 1% levels, indicating that the industry effects do not play determinant 
roles in the deteriorations of CB issuers’ operating performances.  
 
Examination into the subsample issuers’ performances allow us to see that the changes in 
average performances of the debt-like portfolio and mixed portfolio are not significant, 
and the change in average performance of the equity-like portfolio is only significant at a 
10% level. The median changes are significant for all subsamples, but we notice that the 
median change of the debt-like portfolio becomes less significant when using abnormal 
performance measure (significant under 10% level in Table 8.2) than using the raw 
performance measure (significant under 5% level in Table 8.1), indicating that a part of 
the performance deterioration of the debt-like issuer is affected by industry factors, 
whereas, industry factors do not play as much important roles in the other two subsample 
portfolios.  
 
5.3.2 Comparison of Operating Performance among Subsample Convertible Bonds 
 
We notice from the results in Table 8.1 and Table 8.2 that although all of the 3 
subsamples of issuers went through deteriorations in average operating performance from   52
the pre-issuance period to the post-issuance period, significant deterioration in the 
average operating performance is only found in the equity-like portfolio (t-statistic= -3.14 
in Table 8.1 and -1.79 in Table 8.2).  
 
Table 8.3 displays the comparison results between the debt-like portfolio and the equity-
like portfolio in average raw operating performance and average abnormal operating 
performance. During periods both before and after the CB issuances, the average debt-
like issuer outperforms the average equity-like issuer, and this result is robust by 
removing the industry effect, indicating that the outperformance of the average debt-like 
issuer is driven by the issuer-specific factors.  
 
As for the median performance, in the pre-issuance period, the median equity-like issuer 
strongly outperform the other CB issuers (16.155 relative to 14.485 of the median debt-
like issuer and 13.180 of the median mixed issuer), and this outperformance is not driven 
by industry effects because its abnormal performance measure (0.237) is also higher than 
that for the median debt-like issuer (-0.023) and the median mixed issuer (-2.355). In 
stark contrast, in the post issuance period, the median equity-like issuer underperform the 
debt-like issuer and the mixed issuers to a great extend, which again is mostly determined 
by the issuer-specific reasons rather than by the industrial factors. The pre and post 
issuance performance changes are the most significant in the median equity-like CB 
issuers.  
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To get a clearer picture of how much the industry factors affect the issuers’ performances, 
we compare the issuers and their matching firms over the [-3, 3] years’ period. Results 
are displayed in Table 8.4, where the z-statistics of Wilcoxon sign rank test are reported, 
testing the null hypotheses of no difference between the median issuers and the median 
non-issuers. We notice that, for the whole sample of CB issuers, in years prior to the CB 
issuances, there were not significant differences between the issuers and the non-issuing 
matching firms, but the issuers’ performances differ significantly from that of the non-
issuers from exactly the year of the CB issuances, indicating a drastic change in the 
factors that determine the issuers’ performance. When analyzing into subsample CB 
issuers, we notice that their performances do not differ significantly from their industry 
matchers before the CB issuances, but from the year of the CB issuances onwards, the 
median issuer of the mixed portfolio significantly underperformed the industry. Similar 
finding is observed in the equity-like portfolio, where we find that from the first year 
subsequent to the CB issuance, the median equity-like issuer underperform its industry to 
a great extend. But over the entire 7 years surrounding the issuances, the operating 
performance of the median debt-like issuer never differ significantly from its industry 
matcher.  
 
5.4 Long-run Risks of Convertible Bond Issuers’ Outstanding Equities 
 
Besides the operating performance, it is suspected that the stock return performance is 
also related to the risk level of the equity. In this subsection, we examine into the changes 
in equity risks around CB issuances. 
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Referring to the market model, t i t m i i t i R R , , , ε β α + + = , the total equity risk of firm-i is: 
 
                                           ) ( ) ( ) ( , ,
2
, t i t m j t i Var R Var R Var ε β + =                                    (21) 
 
The total risk consists of 2 parts, one is the systematic risk (  ) ( ,
2
t m j R Var β  ), caused by the 
risk on the whole market (  ) ( ,t m R Var ), and the other one is the residual variance 
( ) ( ,t i Var ε =
2
,t i ε σ ) which is idiosyncratic of firm- i.  
 
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
 
Table 9.1 reports changes in annual equity risks from pre issuance period to post issuance 
period for the whole sample CB issuers and each of the subsample portfolios. The equity 
risks in the first year prior to the issuances are estimated using the [-250, 0) days’ daily 
stock returns, the equity risks in the second year prior to the issuances are calculated 
using the [-504, -250) days’ daily stock returns, and the equity risks in the third year prior 
to the issuances are calculated using the [-756, -504) days’ daily stock returns. Similarly, 
the post issuance years’ annual risks are calculated using the corresponding daily stock 
returns.  
 
We notice from Table 9.1 that firstly, from the pre issuance period to the post issuance 
period, both the average issuer and the median issuer of the whole sample experienced 
significant decrease in the equity beta and significant increase in the residual variance 
and the total equity risk. Secondly, the debt-like portfolio underwent significant decrease   55
in the equity beta from the pre issuance period to the post issuance period. Although the 
other 2 portfolios also experienced decrease in equity-betas, neither of the changes is 
significant. Thirdly, the equity-like portfolio went through the most significant increase 
in residual variance and the total risk.  
 
We also examine the role of industry effect in determining the changes in the equity risks. 
Table 9.2 displays the differences between the risks of the CB issuers and their non-
issuing matching firms. First, for the whole sample of CB issuers, the equity beta 
significantly increased relative to their matching firms since the second year preceding 
the CB issuances, and the increase in equity-beta continued until the third years after the 
issuances. At the same time, the issuers’ residual variances decreased significantly 
relative to their industry matchers from the second year prior to the CB issuances until 
two years after the issuances. The total equity risks of the issuers’ also decrease 
significantly around the CB issuances. Second, for subsample portfolios, similar 
increases in equity beta relative to the matching firms are found, and the differences 
between the equity-like portfolio and their matching firms are observed to be the most 
significant. The equity beta of the debt-like portfolio only significant surpassed that of its 
matching firms’ in the first year subsequent to the CB issuances. Third, the residual 
variance and the total risks of the debt-like portfolio significant decreased relative to their 
matching firms both before and after the CB issuances, while similar degrees of decrease 
in equity risks are not observed in the mixed portfolio or the equity-like portfolio. 
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By comparing the average equity risks of the debt-like portfolio and the equity-like 
portfolios (see Table 9.3), we find that in both the pre issuance years and the post 
issuance years, the debt-like portfolio is significant less risky than the equity-like 
portfolio under any one of the risk measures, the equity beta, the residual variance, or the 
total risk. It is worth noting that during the post issuance years, the idiosyncratic risks 
(residual variance) of the equity-portfolio increased significantly relative to the debt-like 
portfolio.  
 
5.5 Combination of Results in the Long-run and the Short-run 
 
So far, we have confirmed the findings in previous studies that the CB issuances in the 
US market as a whole are accompanied with negative abnormal stock returns in the short-
run announcement period and the long-run post issuances years. 
 
By surveying into different subsamples, we find that in the short-run, the equity-like CB 
issuances induce the largest degree of negative market reactions, which are also the most 
significant and last for the longest time. In the post-issuance long-run period, the 
companies issuing equity-like CBs went through the largest degree of abnormal 
underperformance in buy and hold stock returns, meanwhile its operating performance 
deteriorated the most severely, which significantly underperform both the debt-like CB 
issuers and their industry matchers.  
 
Combining the findings in the short-run and the long-run, there seem to be a large degree 
of consistency, since the companies that receive the worst market reactions in the short-  57
run indeed turn out to perform the worst in the long-run. We run regression of the short-
run announcement effect on the issuers’ long-run operating performances, and we find 
that the post-issuance operating performance turns out to be significant explanatory 
variable for the announcement effect. Results are reported in Table 10 and Table 11, the 
post-issuance 3-year average OIBD/Assets explains 0.95% of the cumulative abnormal 
stock returns over the (-2, 2) days’ event window, where we notice in contrast that the 
pre-issuance operating performance does not have significant effect on the short-run 
announcement effect.  
 
[Insert Table 10 Here] 
 
We also study the effect of the issuer’s long-run operating performance on the 
announcement effect by controlling the changes in the issuers’ equity risks. We include 
the issuers’ equity betas, the residual variances, and the total equity risks, and then re-run 
the regression of the announcement effect on the explanatory variables for the pre-
issuance period and the post-issuance period, respectively. Results are reported in Table 
11. We notice that in general the short-run announcement effects are not significantly 
relevant to the issuers’ equity risk and the issuer’s post-issuance operating performance 
still turns out to be a significant explanatory variable for the announcement effect.  
 
[Insert Table 11 Here] 
 
We explain the finding of the consistency between the long-run and short-run by 
claiming that the market unbiasedlly foresees the issuers’ operating performances at the   58
time of the CB issuance announcements. Moreover, when we refer back to Table 4, 
where the median estimate of growth rate of stock price appreciation, the market to book 
ratio, and Tobin’s Q all indicate that firms in the equity-like portfolios are regarded to 
have greater growth opportunities prior to the CB issuances, it is understandable that the 
market is immediately adjusting its perception about the issuers’ true future performance 
by observing information signaled by the CB issuances. This finding and explanation is 
compatible with Lewis, Rogalski and Seward (2001), who pointed out that the post 
issuance deteriorations in the CB issuers’ operating performances are not predicted by 
professional analysts prior to the CB issuances.  
 
 6. Conclusions and Future Research Directions 
 
6.1 Summary 
 
The convertible bond (CB), which is a nonstandard financing instrument, is hybrid of the 
straight debt and the common equity, and it is viewed to have a risk level in between that 
of the straight debt and the common equity. Previous studies have revealed that the 
announcement period market reaction to CB issuances is right in between the reactions to 
the straight debt and common equity, for example Mikkelson and Partch (1986). Such 
phenomenon is consistent with the pecking order hypothesis of the M& M model (1984), 
which predicts that companies follow a pecking order when they make decisions to 
procure financings, beginning with a best choice of internal financing and ending up with 
a worst choice of equity financing. Since this strategy is well understood by the market, 
different financing decisions are interpreted and received differently by the market.    59
 
In this study, we notice that CBs are not uniformly the same throughout the whole sample. 
While some CBs are more resemblant to straight debts, others are more like common 
equities. We therefore examined the CBs from a subsampling perspective according to 
different degrees of equity components in different CBs. The whole universe of CBs can 
thus be regarded as a miniature of the whole range of debt-equity capital structure.  
 
By introducing and evaluating several measurements of equity components in CBs, we 
recommend the use of hedge ratioΔ, and then we manage to divide the whole sample of 
CBs into a debt-like portfolio, a mixed portfolio, and an equity-like portfolio. We find 
that the short-run announcement effects on CB issuances follow a strict pecking order 
hierarchy that the companies issuance debt-like CBs receive the least degree of negative 
market reactions, the companies issuance equity-like CBs receive the largest degree of 
negative market reactions, and those that offer CBs with mixed components of debt and 
equity receive a degree of negative market reaction in between.  
 
A long-run analysis into the CB issuers’ stock return performances, operating 
performances, and changes in equity risks allow us to see that firstly during the years 
subsequent to the CB issuances, the long-run buy and hold stock returns of the equity-like 
issuers significantly underperform the industry benchmark and the market index 
benchmark, and it also significantly under perform the buy and hold stock returns of the 
debt-like portfolio when both of them are equally weighted. Secondly, in the post-
issuance period, the issuers of the equity-like portfolio experienced the largest degree of   60
deteriorations in their operating performances both in terms of means and in terms of 
medians, inducing them to significantly underperform the debt-like CB issuers as well as 
their industry matchers. Further, by removing the industry effects, we notice that the 
issuers’ post issuance operating performances are largely determined by changes in the 
issuers’ specific characteristics. Thirdly, the debt-like portfolio went through significant 
decrease in the systematic risk (equity beta) and significant increase in the idiosyncratic 
risk (residual variance) and total risk, while its systematic risk is still (insignificantly) 
higher than the industry level and the idiosyncratic risk and total risk are still 
(significantly) lower than the industry level. The equity-like portfolio experienced 
insignificant decrease in the systematic risk and a significant increase in the idiosyncratic 
risk and the total risk, while the systematic risk is still (significantly) higher than the 
industry and the idiosyncratic risk and the total risk are still (insignificantly) lower than 
the industry level. 
 
Combining our findings for the CB issuers in the short-run and the long-run, we realize 
that the issuers’ long-run performance are to a large extend consistent with the short-run 
market reactions they have received. In fact, the issuers’ post issuance realized long-run 
operating performances significantly explain the announcement period market reactions. 
We thus conclude by saying that the market unbiasedlly forecasts the issuers’ future 
operating performances basing on the specific designs of CBs at the time when the CBs 
are offered, and then it reacts accordingly. In the long-run subsequent to the CB issuances, 
the market perceptions turn into reality, and the perceived bad companies indeed   61
experienced severe deteriorations in their performances, and at the same time they entail 
more idiosyncratic risks and total equity risks.  
 
6.2 Future Research Directions 
 
While the results in this paper provide us a miniature view into the debt-equity capital 
structure, further research can be easily extended by including real data of the straight 
debt issuances and the common equity issuances (SEO and IPO) to examine whether 
similar patterns exist during the short-run announcement period and the post issuance 
long-run period. Previous studies such as Bae, Jeong, Sun and Tang (2002) have 
examined different behaviors of issuers that offer straight debts, common equities, as well 
as CBs, and their results showed that issuers who offer straight debts indeed perform 
better both in the short-run and in the long-run. But according to their results, the 
distinctions between CB issuers and common equity issuers are less significant. We argue 
that because CBs are not uniformly the same, it is suggestible that we examine different 
CBs separately by assuming a subsampling perspective. In a study which includes all the 
data about straight debts, CBs, and equities, we expect that in the short-run 
announcement period, the degree of negative market reactions to different security issuers 
follows an increasing order from straight-debts, debt-like CBs, equity-like CBs, to 
common equities. In the post issuance long-run period, we expect that the holding period 
returns of the issuers’ outstanding shares follow a declining order from the straight-debt 
portfolio to the debt-like CB portfolio, followed by the equity-like CB portfolio, and 
finally the common equity portfolio. Meanwhile, the deterioration of the issuers’ 
operating performances would be the most dramatic in the common equities issuers,   62
followed by the equity-like CB issuer, the debt-like CB issuers, and the issuers of straight 
debts. Also, some similar patterns in the long-run equity risks may also be expected. 
 
Besides, future researches can also be carried out from the following aspects. Firstly, the 
information signaled by the mixed portfolio as defined in this study can be explored, 
which might be quite complicated because of a large amount of uncertainties involved. 
Secondly, future study may relax the classical assumption that the stock returns follow 
standard normal distribution, which is not exactly the case in reality. In this study, we still 
adopt the standard normal assumption because the subsampling criterion used here, the 
hedge ratio, is derived from the Black-Scholes option pricing framework, where the stock 
prices are assumed to follow geometric Brownian motion and standard normal stock 
return distribution is presumed. However, some other assumptions on the stock price 
dynamics and thus stock return distribution can also be tried if we divide our subsamples 
according to some other criteria.  
 
Thirdly, further research can therefore be carried out to improve on the subsampling 
criterion. Hedge ratio is used this paper as the subsampling criterion, where we treat CBs 
almost equivalently as European call options. However, the defect follows from this is 
obvious, because early conversions are possible in the real practices for the callable CBs 
and many CBs are even putable by the investors before the final maturities. Hence, some 
other ways that can provide more accurate measurement of the equity components in CBs 
may be explored and applied. For example, a more accurate conversion probability of 
CBs can be derived by combining the studies of optimal call strategies of the CB issuers   63
and taking into consideration of the probabilities of defaults. In addition, the estimation 
of hedge ratio can also be improved if we are able to find more accurate estimations for 
its input variables. For instance, in this paper we estimate the risk free interest rate (r) 
basing on the daily US treasure constant maturities 10 year-middle rate reported by 
DataStream. Future research can try to employ or develop more sophisticated techniques 
to estimate the risk free rate. Also, in this paper we estimate the drift parameter of the 
geometric Brownian motion by converting the IBES estimation of the EPS growth rate 
into a continuous compounded form and the stock volatility is estimated using historical 
data, but future research can apply other techniques to obtain better estimations.  
 
Fourthly, improvements on the results may also be achieved by looking for some other 
ways of constructing and detecting the abnormal performances of the issuers’. (1) When 
studying the short-run announcement effect, in this paper we follow the conventional 
event study methodology by defining the abnormal stock returns as the differences 
between the realized stock returns and the expected returns estimated from market 
models, and we document the existence of abnormal returns basing on the standardized 
cross sectional t-statistics and nonparametric sign-test statistics. As we mentioned 
previously, some models other than the market model are also available for estimating 
stock returns with perhaps better forecast capacities, such as Fama French factor models, 
CAPM, and APT model. Further research can be developed by applying those models. In 
addition, while the standardized cross sectional t-statistics incorporates information from 
both the estimation period and the event period, the nonparametric sign-test statistics is 
free from a specific assumption about the stock returns, and the GARCH-based test   64
statistic (Savickas 2003) models the event-induced volatilities, it is suspected that the size 
of the sample may affect the performances of the statistics. To overcome this criticism, 
we can for example use the bootstrap method and adopt the test of Baixauli (2007), which 
was designed to detecting abnormal returns when the event analyzed induces volatility 
and the portfolio is small.  (2) When examining the long-run abnormal stock return 
performance, we use the difference between the buy-and-hold stock returns of CB issuers 
and that of the market or industry benchmarks’. Further research can try to construct the 
abnormal stock return performance using some other methods. For instance, the buy-and-
hold reference portfolios detailed in Lyon et al. (1998) can be applied. (3) In addition, in 
our study, we adopt the exact procedure that Lewis, Rogalski and Seward (2001) used in 
identifying matching firms, where each issuer has one non-issuing counterpart which 
comes from the same industry with the closest firm size. Further research can apply some 
other ways of identifying matching firms. (4) The long-run operating performance in our 
study is evaluated using OIBD/Assets, while other accounting indicators such as ROA, 
profit margin, CRA can also be calculated, although we think that the results may not 
differ qualitatively. Also, like the discussion of Barber and Lyon (1996), further study 
can also include some simulation based method to examine the statistical power of the 
constructed measurement of abnormal performances.  
 
Lastly, in this study we conclude by claiming that the market unbiasedlly forecasts the 
long-run operating performance of the CB issuers’ basing on the observation of a 
statistical significance between the short-run announcement effect and the post issuance 
long-run operating performance in a linear regression model. Although we argue that this   65
linear regression model suffices to give us useful implications, we suspect that 
improvements may be achieved by further exploring the validity of this linear model. For 
example, further research can try to identify whether some important explanatory 
variables have been omitted and whether some nonlinear model specifications are able to 
capture the reality better.  
   66
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Appendix I 
Exact value of embedded call warrant in Convertible Bond 
 
According to modified Black-Scholes model, the value of European call option is 
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Assume first that each CB is composed of one unit of straight debt plus several units of 
warrants. Each unit of warrant is exercisable into one unit of new equity, and λ  is the 
ratio of outstanding warrants to the number of outstanding shares. The number of 
outstanding equities increases as a result of the conversion, which creates dilution effect. 
Therefore, the value of one unit of call warrant is ) 1 /( λ + C .  
 
Since each unit of CB is convertible into several units of equities, the number of which 
equals to the conversion ratio, suppose the number of outstanding shares is  S n and the 
number of CBs offered is CB n , therefore,  
 
S
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n
n ratio conversion ⋅
= λ . 
 
The total value of warrants in each unit of CB equals to:  
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Corrected conversion probability under true probability measure 
 
Under the true probability measure, the returns that investors expect from investing in 
stocks are more than a risk free interest rate. Assuming that the underlying stock price of 
CB follows geometric Brownian motion, such that  t t t dW dt S dS σ μ + = / , where μ  is the 
drift, σ  is the volatility, and Wt is a standard Brownian motion, the stock prices  t S  are 
lognormally distributed. Thus, the log returns ln( t T S S / ) follow normal distribution with 
mean (T-t)(μ - 2 /
2 σ ) and standard deviation  t T − σ . 
 
At time t, T S , which is T-t period away in the future, is not observable. The conversion 
probability of CBs is approximated by the probability that the embedded call option in 
CB expires in-the-money (or at-the-money) by the time of maturity T.  
 
By standardization, 
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the estimated probability of conversion is: 
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This conversion probability is different from “p”, the conversion probability used by 
Lewis, Rogalski and Seward (1999) in that the returns that investors require by investing 
in the underlying stock is assumed to beμ , which is higher than the risk free rate of 
return r.    76
Explicit derivation of hedge ratio (delta) from modified Black-Scholes model 
The value for a European call option is:  
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Appendix II 
 
Figure 1 
Annual Distribution of Sample CB Issuances (1976-2006) 
 
Figure 1.1 Annual Distribution of Sample CB Issuances by Frequency 
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Note: The sample contains 969 CB offering observations, which is used for the short-run event 
study. Some of the observations are subject to further elimination for the purpose of long-run 
analysis.    78
Figure 1.2 – Annual distribution of sample CB offerings by issue size 
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Note: The sample contains 969 CB offering observations, which is used for the short-run event 
study. Some of the observations are subject to further elimination for the purpose of long-run 
analysis. The issue sizes are measured by gross proceeds (in millions of dollars), which are 
reported by SDC.     79
Figure 2 
Industry distribution of sample CB issuances (1976-2006) 
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Figure 3 
Plots of Estimated Values for Measurements of Equity Components 
 
Figure 3.1 Distribution of hedge ratio  
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Note: 1. Hedge ratio is derived from the modified Black-Scholes model, such that 
Δ =  }
) 2 / ( ) / ln(
{
2
T
T d r K S
N e
dT
σ
σ + − + −  
2. There are 795 CB issuance observations that have non-missing values of Δ, which are then 
ranked in an ascending order. The higher the ranking in Δ is, the more equity like the CB is. 
According to the rankings in Δ , a CB issuance is grouped into the debt-like portfolio if its 
rankings falls into [1, 265], the mixed portfolio if its ranking falls into [266, 530], and the equity-
like portfolio if its ranking falls into [531, 795].   81
Figure 3.2 – Estimated conversion probability  
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Note: Conversion probability Pr=N(
T
T K St
σ
σ μ ) 2 / ( ) / ln(
2 − +
).  There are 795 CB issuance 
observations with non-missing values of Conversion probability, which are then ranked in an 
ascending order.  The higher the conversion probability the more equity-like the CB is. 
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Figure 3.3 - Estimated moneyness  
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Note: moneyness= (S-K)/K. The higher the value in moneyness, the more equity-like the CB is 
designed.    83
Figure 3.4 – Estimated time to becoming at-the-money  
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Note: Time = [ln(K)-ln(S)]/μ , with μ equals to the anticipated rate of stock price appreciation. 
The shorter the estimated time to becoming at-the-money, the more equity-like the CB is 
designed to be.  
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Appendix III 
 
                                                                  Table 1 
Annual distribution of whole sample CB issuances observations over 1976 to 2006 
 
Table 1.1 Annual distributions of whole sample CB issuances 
 
The sample contains 969 CB issuance observations, which is used for the short-run event study. 
Some of the observations are subject to further elimination for the purpose of long-run analysis. 
The sample satisfying the criteria of our long-run analysis consists of 619 issuance observations, 
which has essentially the same pattern as the sample for short-run study, and thus is not reported. 
 
Year  Frequency  Percent %  Cumulative Frequency 
1976 13  1.34  13 
1977 7  0.72  20 
1978 6  0.62  26 
1979 15  1.55  41 
1980 62  6.40  103 
1981 54  5.57  157 
1982 38  3.92  195 
1983 56  5.78  251 
1984 35  3.61  286 
1985 71  7.33  357 
1986 116  11.97  473 
1987 94  9.70  567 
1988 22  2.27  589 
1989 35  3.61  624 
1990 28  2.89  652 
1991 29  2.99  681 
1992 50  5.16  731 
1993 40  4.13  771 
1994 18  1.86  789 
1995 22  2.27  811 
1996 29  2.99  840 
1997 25  2.58  865 
1998 10  1.03  875 
1999 14  1.44  889 
2000 20  2.06  909 
2001 24  2.48  933 
2002 3  0.31  936 
2003 6  0.62  942 
2004 8  0.83  950 
2005 6  0.62  956 
2006 13  1.34  969 
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Table 1.2 Annual distributions of whole sample CB issuances 
 
 Debt-like  Mixed  Equity-like 
   Year    Frequency  Percent % Frequency Percent % Frequency Percent % 
1976  4 1.51 2 0.75 1 0.38 
1977  2 0.75 3 1.13 3 1.13 
1978  6 2.26 1 0.38 1 0.38 
1979  22  8.30 3 1.13 4 1.51 
1980  15 5.66  6  2.26 22 8.30 
1981  10 3.77  7  2.64 20 7.55 
1982  22 8.30  5  1.89 11 4.15 
1983  9 3.40 8 3.02  14  5.28 
1984  20 7.55  6  2.26 11 4.15 
1985  21 7.92 12 4.53 27  10.19 
1986  18 6.79 21 7.92 54  20.38 
1987  5  1.89 15 5.66 40  15.09 
1988  6 2.26 6 2.26 8 3.02 
1989  9  3.40 15 5.66 11 4.15 
1990  18 6.79  5  1.89 10 3.77 
1991  14  5.28 6 2.26 3 1.13 
1992  9  3.40 27  10.19 3  1.13 
1993  5  1.89 19 7.17  5  1.89 
1994  8  3.02 10 3.77  1  0.38 
1995  8 3.02 8 3.02 2 0.75 
1996  4  1.51 18 6.79  5  1.89 
1997  6  2.26 16 6.04  7  2.64 
1998  3 1.13 3 1.13 1 0.38 
1999  3 1.13 5 1.89 1 0.38 
2000  5 1.89 6 2.26 1 0.38 
2001  5  1.89 11 4.15  3  1.13 
2002  1 0.38 3 1.13 1 0.38 
2003  2 0.75 1 0.38 4 1.51 
2004  5 1.89 6 2.26  22  8.30 
2005  4 1.51 3 1.13  20  7.55 
2006  2 0.75 8 3.02 0  0   86
                                                                  Table 2 
Industry distribution of sample CB issuances over 1976 to 2006 
 
Table 2.1 Industry distribution of sample CB issuances over 1976 to 2006 
Industry  Frequency  Percent %  Cumulative Frequency
Manufacturing 427  44.20  427 
Retail 96  9.94  523 
Pers/Bus/RepSvc 92  9.52  615 
Natural Resource  73  7.56  688 
Healthcare 49  5.07  737 
Wholesale 48  4.97  785 
Transportation 43  4.45  828 
Restaurant/Hotel 39  4.04  867 
Radio/TV/Telecom 32  3.31  899 
Leisure 25  2.59  924 
Construction 24  2.48  948 
Sanitation 11  1.14  959 
Agriculture 3  0.31  962 
Other Services  3  0.31  965 
Mortgage Securities 1  0.10  966 
Note:  The industry information for 3 observations is missing.   87
Table 2.2 Industry distribution of sample CB issuances over 1976 to 2006 
Debt-like Mixed  Equity-like 
Industry Frequency  %  Industry Frequency %  Industry Frequency % 
Manufacturing 135  50.94  Manufacturing 133  50.19 Manufacturing  97  36.6
Retail  29 10.94  Pers/Bus/Rep  Svc 32 12.08 Retail  35 13.21
Natural Resource  25  9.43  Retail  19  7.17 Natural Resource  26  9.81
Pers/Bus/Rep  19  7.17  Natural Resource  15  5.66 Pers/Bus/Rep Svc  22  8.3 
Transportation  17 6.42 Wholesale  12 4.53 Healthcare  17 6.42
Wholesale  12 4.53 Healthcare  10 3.77 Restaurant/Hotel  17 6.42
Construction  8  3.02  Transportation  10 3.77 Wholesale  15 5.66
Restaurant/Hotel 6  2.26  Restaurant/Hotel 9 3.4  Radio/TV/Telecom  10  3.77
Leisure  5 1.89  Leisure  7 2.64 Sanitation  8 3.02
Healthcare  4 1.51  Radio/TV/Telecom 7 2.64 Transportation  8 3.02
Agriculture  2  0.75  Construction 6  2.26 Construction 6  2.26
Radio/TV/Telecom  2 0.75  Other  Services  3 1.13 Leisure  3 1.13
Sanitation  1 0.38 Sanitation  2 0.75 Agriculture  1 0.38
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                                                                  Table 3 
Summary statistics for measurement of equity components in CBs 
 
Table 3.1 Summary statistics of whole sample of CB issuances 
 
Variable  Number 
 of obs. 
Std. Mean Min Median Max 
Hedge RatioΔ  795 0.263  0.763  0.000  0.858  1.000 
conversion probability Pr  795 0.228  0.358  0.000  0.332  1.000 
moneyness  938 0.523  -0.108  -0.845  -0.169  11.373 
Time  556 10.435  1.816  0.000  1.111  243.394 
Volatility σ   969 0.264  0.500  0.143  0.433  3.480 
Dividend Yield d 818  0.105  0.025  0.000  0.000  1.742 
Risk Free Rate  r 969  0.023  0.083  0.032  0.077  0.140 
Current Price S  968 19.004  26.383  0.635  22.861  272.542 
Conversion Price K  939 21.566  30.868  0.500  27.250  327.92 
Maturity T 966  7.14  17.91  3.00  20.00  36.00 
 
Note: Hedge ratio Δ =  )
) 2 / ( ) / ln(
(
2
T
T d r K S
N e
dT
σ
σ + − + − ,  
Conversion probability Pr=N(
T
T K St
σ
σ μ ) 2 / ( ) / ln(
2 − +
, 
moneyness = (S-K)/K, 
Time = [ln(K)-ln(S)]/μ , with μ equals to the anticipated rate of stock price appreciation.   89
Table 3.2 Summary statistics of subsamples of CB issuances 
Panel 1. Debt-like portfolio 
Variable  Number 
of obs. 
Std. Mean Min  Median Max 
Hedge RatioΔ  265 0.239  0.457  0.000  0.530  0.750 
conversion probability Pr  265 0.222  0.339  0.000  0.340  0.997 
moneyness  265 0.761  -0.100  -0.845  -0.171  11.373 
Time  169 18.806  3.315  0.000  1.373  243.394 
Volatility σ   265 0.192  0.401  0.196  0.358  1.876 
Dividend Yield d  265 0.174  0.073  0.000  0.029  1.742 
Risk Free Rate  r  265 0.023  0.084  0.031  0.079  0.138 
Current Price S  265 21.834  31.113  2.319  28.042  272.542 
Conversion Price K  265 20.132  36.533  2.630  33.000  129.130 
Maturity T  265 7.48  18.22  3.00  20.00  31.00 
Panel 2. Mixed portfolio 
Variable  Number 
of obs. 
Std. Mean Min  Median Max 
Hedge RatioΔ  265 0.052  0.857  0.751  0.858  0.941 
conversion probability Pr  265 0.211  0.358  0.006  0.314  0.999 
moneyness  265 0.244  -0.139  -0.811  -0.175  2.548 
Time  175 1.390  1.277  0.000  1.102  14.343 
Volatility σ   265 0.210  0.530  0.168  0.506  1.188 
Dividend Yield d  265 0.006  0.003  0.000  0.000  0.081 
Risk Free Rate  r  265 0.021  0.073  0.038  0.069  0.138 
Current Price S  265 17.175  24.783  1.399  20.750  134.383 
Conversion Price K  265 26.310  30.347  1.130  26.250  327.920 
Maturity T  265 6.93  14.03  3.00  10.00  30.00 
Panel 3. Equity-like portfolio 
Variable  Number 
of obs. 
Std. Mean Min  Median Max 
Hedge RatioΔ  265 0.016  0.974  0.941  0.976  1.000 
conversion probability Pr  265 0.250  0  .376  0.001  0.342  0.991 
moneyness  265 0.482  -0.079  -0.512  -0.162  5.834 
Time  144 0.782  1.013  0.000  0.959  4.424 
Volatility σ   265 0.266  0.561  0.174  0.503  1.715 
Dividend Yield d  265 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.002 
Risk Free Rate  r  265 0.022  0.089  0.042  0.085  0.140 
Current Price S  265 16.248  22.732  0.635  18.785  95.681 
Conversion Price K  265 18.706  26.172  0.500  21.750  127.660 
Maturity T  265 4.67  21.13  5.00  20.00  30.00 
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Table 3.3 Pearson correlation coefficients of measurement of equity components 
  Δ  moneyness Time  Pr 
Δ  1 0.0253  -0.0253  0.1816 
moneyness  0.0253 1 -0.0534  0.2156 
Time  -0.0253 -0.0534  1  -0.0324 
Pr 0.1816  0.2156  -0.0324  1 
Note: Basing on the whole sample of 969 CB issuance observations.  
Hedge ratio Δ =  )
) 2 / ( ) / ln(
(
2
T
T d r K S
N e
dT
σ
σ + − + − ,  
Conversion probability Pr=N(
T
T K St
σ
σ μ ) 2 / ( ) / ln(
2 − +
, 
moneyness = (S-K)/K, 
Time = [ln(K)-ln(S)]/μ , with μ equals to the anticipated rate of stock price appreciation.   91
Table 4 
Characteristics of different portfolios at the time of CB issuances 
 
MVE is market value of the issuer’s outstanding equities, calculated as the product of Common Shares (#54) 
and Fiscal year end closing price (#199). Financial leverage is computed to be the sum of Total Long-Term 
Debt (#9), Debt in Current Liabilities (#34), carrying value of Preferred Stock (#130), Dividends of 
Preferred stocks In Arrears (#242), subtracting Cash and Short- Term Investments (#1) and divided by 
MVE. CE+RD/ASSETS is defined as the sum of Capital Expenditures (#128) and Research and 
Development Expense (#46) divided by Total assets (#6). M/B is the ratio of the equity’s market value 
(MVE) over its book value (#60). Tobin’s Q is defined by summing MVE, the liquidating value of 
Preferred Stock (#10), Total Long-Term Debt (#9) and Debt in Current Liabilities (#34), subtracting Cash 
and Short- Term Investments (#1), and scaling by Total Assets (#6). *, **, and *** correspond to 
significant difference under 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. The t-statistics are from T-test of the null of no 
difference in the means of the debt-like and equity-like portfolios. 
  All    Debt-like Mixed Equity-like D-E  t- stat.
Measures of equity components     
Hedge ratio Δ  0.76 0.46 0.86 0.97 -0.52  *** -35.11
Conversion Probability Pr 0.36 0.34 0.36 0.38 -0.04   1.01
Moneyness  -0.11 -0.09 -0.15 -0.08 -0.01   -0.38
Time  1.82 3.32 1.28 1.01 2.31   1.59
Characteristics of CB issuances     
Conversion Price K 30.88 35.97 30.32 26.08 10.33  *** 6.14
Conversion Premium  22.19 22.46 22.46 21.35 1.11  ** 1.99
Conversion Ratio  57.51 35.36 35.36 81.26 -45.90  *** 5.23
Current Price S  26.39 30.75 24.45 22.54 8.33  *** 5.01
Dividend Yield d  0.03 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.07  *** 6.84
Volatility σ   0.50 0.40 0.53 0.56 -0.16  *** -7.96
Maturity T  17.90 18.36 14.06 21.19 -2.91  *** -5.38
Coupon (%)  7.70 7.46 6.83 8.43 -0.97  *** -3.93
Issue Size (mil$)  120.52 152.56 128.23 81.79 70.78  *** 3.03
Characteristics of CB issuers     
Total Assets (mil$)  2343.57 4745.99 1540.75 366.57 4379.42  ** 1.96
MVE 1618.12 2250.45 1683.13 474.67 1775.78  *** 4.43
Common Shares Outstanding (mil$)   50.43 66.11 59.67 19.18 46.93  *** 3.77
Debt in Current Liabilities (mil$)  204.21 531.58 55.29 10.56 521.01   1.31
Financial Leverage  0.53 0.62 0.56 0.45 0.16   1.58
Net Sales (mil $)  1903.22 3778.01 1330.15 379.10 3398.90  *** 3.50
EPS ($)   0.81 1.31 0.43 0.70 0.60  *** 2.94
Net Income (Loss) (mil$)  49.58 97.28 15.08 13.17 84.11  *** 2.86
R & D Expense (mil$)   83.30 165.94 70.83 20.31 145.63  ** 2.51
Capital Expenditures (mil$)  157.41 297.46 113.60 34.31 263.15  ** 2.63
CE+RD/ASSETS 14.71 12.43 15.45 16.85 -4.42  *** -3.29
Median Estimate μ   19.90 14.64 21.26 23.99 -9.35  *** -9.59
M/B 2.93 2.33 3.76 2.95 -0.62   -1.24
Tobin’s Q (%)  1.41 1.12 1.66 1.48 -0.36  *** -3.92  92
 
                                                                  Table 5 
Announcement effects of CB issuances 
Table 5.1 Announcement period abnormal stock returns 
 
Panel A. Test of ordinary cross-sectional t statistics 
 
AAR is the cross-sectional average of daily abnormal returns and ACAR is the cumulative sum of AAR 
around issuance announcements.  The t-statistics are the ordinary cross-sectional t statistics, testing the null 
hypothesis of no announcement effects. As the number of observations in a portfolio, n, increases to 
infinity,  
t=
) 1 ( / ) / (
/
1
2
1
1
− − ∑∑
∑
==
=
n n n AR AR
n AR
n
i
n
i i i
n
i i
 ~ N (0, 1). 
 
    Whole sample           Debt-like             Mixed              Equity-like         
Event window  AAR  t- stat.  AAR  t- stat. AAR  t- stat.  AAR  t- stat. 
-5  -0.0013 -1.35 0.0008 0.58  -0.0032 -1.69 -0.0015 -0.68 
-4 0.0000  -0.01  0.0030  2.13  -0.0015 -0.88  0.0003  0.22 
-3  0.0000  0.02 0.0038 2.54  -0.0012 -0.65 -0.0027 -1.66 
-2 -0.0008  -0.91  -0.0011  -0.81  0.0004 0.23  -0.0027  -1.37 
-1  -0.0019 -2.09 -0.0024  -1.67  0.0000 -0.03 -0.0031 -1.59 
0  -0.0101 -9.12 -0.0077  -5.09  -0.0129 -5.50 -0.0110 -4.43 
1  -0.0051 -4.97 -0.0025  -1.58  -0.0074 -3.41 -0.0075 -3.57 
2  -0.0015 -1.67 0.0001 0.09  -0.0025 -1.42 -0.0026 -1.39 
3  -0.0006 -0.70 -0.0007  -0.44  -0.0001 -0.07 -0.0020 -1.08 
4 0.0005  0.57  0.0002  0.13  0.0030 1.63  -0.0011  -0.66 
5  -0.0013 -1.54 0.0000 -0.03  -0.0022 -1.35 -0.0018 -0.95 
  ACAR  t- stat.  ACAR  t- stat. ACAR t- stat.  ACAR  t- stat. 
(0,  1)  -0.0152 -9.93 -0.0102  -4.94  -0.0202 -5.98 -0.0185 -5.85 
(-1,0)  -0.0121 -8.21 -0.0102  -4.54  -0.0129 -4.37 -0.0141 -4.21 
(-1,1)  -0.0171 -9.64 -0.0126  -5.11  -0.0203 -5.21 -0.0216 -5.62 
(-2,2)  -0.0195 -8.92 -0.0136  -4.43  -0.0224 -5.03 -0.0269 -5.50 
(-3,3) -0.0201  -7.97 -0.0105 -2.75  -0.0237 -4.58 -0.0316 -6.19 
(-4,4) -0.0196  -7.01 -0.0074 -1.66  -0.0222 -3.89 -0.0324 -5.87 
(-5,5) -0.0222  -7.23 -0.0067 -1.44  -0.0275 -4.42 -0.0357 -5.70 
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Table 5.1 Announcement period abnormal stock returns 
 
Panel B. Test of standardized cross-sectional t statistics 
 
AAR is the cross sectional average of daily abnormal returns and ACAR is the cumulative sum of AAR 
around issuance announcements. The t-statistics are the standardized cross-sectional t statistics testing the 
null hypothesis of no announcement effects. As the number of observations in a portfolio, n, increases to 
infinity,  
t=
) 1 ( / ) / (
/
1
2
1
1
− − ∑∑
∑
==
=
n n n SR SR
n SR
n
i
n
i i i
n
i i
~  1 − n t , where
2
1 2 2 1 , ) ( / ) , (
t i t t t t CAR SR i i ε σ − = . 
 
Whole sample  Debt-like  Mixed  Equity-like   
Event window  AAR  t- stat.  AAR  t- stat. AAR  t- stat.  AAR  t- stat. 
-5 -0.0013  -0.68  0.0008  0.59  -0.0032 -1.67  -0.0015  -0.09 
-4  0.0000 0.39 0.0030 2.00 -0.0015 -1.32 0.0003 0.11 
-3  0.0000 0.39 0.0038 2.36 -0.0012 -0.90 -0.0027 -1.36 
-2 -0.0008  -0.62  -0.0011 -0.72  0.0004  0.18  -0.0027  -0.89 
-1 -0.0019  -2.01  -0.0024 -1.83  0.0000  -0.20  -0.0031  -0.96 
0 -0.0101  -10.23  -0.0077 -5.46  -0.0129 -5.66  -0.0110  -5.12 
1 -0.0051  -3.79  -0.0025 -1.31  -0.0074 -2.93  -0.0075  -2.30 
2 -0.0015  -1.44  0.0001  -0.29  -0.0025 -0.86  -0.0026  -1.33 
3 -0.0006  -0.76  -0.0007 -0.75  -0.0001 0.13  -0.0020  -1.04 
4  0.0005 0.48 0.0002 0.06 0.0030 1.01 -0.0011 -0.66 
5 -0.0013  -1.50  0.0000  -0.27  -0.0022 -1.21  -0.0018  -0.99 
  ACAR  t- stat.  ACAR  t- stat. ACAR  t- stat.  ACAR  t- stat. 
(0, 1)  -0.0152  -9.90  -0.0102 -5.27  -0.0202 -5.71  -0.0185  -5.26 
(-1,0) -0.0121  -9.00  -0.0102 -5.15  -0.0129 -4.55  -0.0141  -4.27 
(-1,1) -0.0171  -9.65  -0.0126 -5.60  -0.0203 -5.08  -0.0216  -4.80 
(-2,2) -0.0195  -8.73  -0.0136 -4.71  -0.0224 -4.67  -0.0269  -4.91 
(-3,3) -0.0201  -7.59  -0.0105  -3.14  -0.0237  -4.48  -0.0316  -5.30 
(-4,4) -0.0196  -6.57  -0.0074  -2.09  -0.0222  -4.15  -0.0324  -5.11 
(-5,5) -0.0222  -6.76  -0.0067  -1.91  -0.0275  -4.60  -0.0357  -5.21 
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Table 5.1 Announcement period abnormal stock returns 
 
Panel C. Test of nonparametric sign-test statistics 
 
AAR is the cross sectional average of daily abnormal returns and ACAR is the cumulative sum of AAR 
around issuance announcements. The t-statistics are nonparametric sign-test statistics, testing the null 
hypothesis of no announcement effects (half of the abnormal returns are positive). As the number of 
observations in a portfolio, n, increases to infinity,  
t=
n
n n
/ 25 . 0
) 5 . 0 / ( −
+
 ~ N (0, 1), where 
+ n  is the number of observations with positive abnormal stock return. 
 
    Whole sample           Debt-like             Mixed              Equity-like         
Event window  AAR  t- stat.  AAR  t- stat. AAR  t- stat.  AAR  t- stat. 
-5  -0.0013 -2.96 0.0008 -1.29  -0.0032 -3.13 -0.0015 -0.92 
-4  0.0000 -2.51 0.0030 0.31  -0.0015 -2.03 0.0003 -1.90 
-3  0.0000 -1.80 0.0038 1.66  -0.0012 -2.27 -0.0027 -1.66 
-2  -0.0008 -2.57 -0.0011  -1.78  0.0004 -0.80 -0.0027 -1.17 
-1  -0.0019 -4.38 -0.0024  -3.38  0.0000 -0.92 -0.0031 -2.52 
0  -0.0101  -10.04  -0.0077  -5.22  -0.0129 -5.10 -0.0110 -6.20 
1  -0.0051 -5.92 -0.0025  -1.78  -0.0074 -4.12 -0.0075 -4.48 
2  -0.0015 -3.28 0.0001 -1.29  -0.0025 -2.40 -0.0026 -1.29 
3  -0.0006 -3.28 -0.0007  -1.90  -0.0001 -1.04 -0.0020 -2.40 
4  0.0005 -2.77 0.0002 -0.43  0.0030 -1.29 -0.0011 -2.27 
5  -0.0013 -1.93 0.0000 0.18  -0.0022 -1.29 -0.0018 -0.92 
  ACAR  t- stat.  ACAR  t- stat. ACAR t- stat.  ACAR  t- stat. 
(0,  1)  -0.0152  -10.42  -0.0102  -4.36  -0.0202 -5.71 -0.0185 -6.82 
(-1,0)  -0.0121 -8.75 -0.0102  -5.47  -0.0129 -3.99 -0.0141 -4.61 
(-1,1)  -0.0171 -9.97 -0.0126  -5.22  -0.0203 -5.34 -0.0216 -5.84 
(-2,2)  -0.0195 -8.95 -0.0136  -4.36  -0.0224 -4.98 -0.0269 -4.73 
(-3,3) -0.0201  -7.79  -0.0105  -3.87  -0.0237 -3.50  -0.0316  -5.34 
(-4,4) -0.0196  -7.59  -0.0074  -3.62  -0.0222 -3.87  -0.0324  -5.47 
(-5,5) -0.0222  -8.11  -0.0067  -3.38  -0.0275 -4.48  -0.0357  -5.10 
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Table 5.1 Announcement period abnormal stock returns 
 
Panel D. Test of GARCH-based statistics 
 
AAR is the cross sectional average of daily abnormal returns and ACAR is the cumulative sum of AAR 
around issuance announcements. The t-statistics are GARCH-based test statistics for the null hypothesis of 
no announcement effects. As the number of observations in a portfolio, n, increases to infinity,  
1
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− −
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∑∑
∑
n n
i
n
i i i
n
i i t
n n n S S
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t , where  t i i i h S , ˆ / ˆ γ = , and  i γˆ  and  t i h , ˆ  are 
estimated from the GARCH (1,1) model:  t i t i t m i i t i D R R , , , η γ β α + ⋅ + ⋅ + = ,  ) , 0 ( ~ | , , t i t t i h N Ω η , 
and  t i t i i t i i i t i D d c h b a h ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + = − −
2
1 , 1 , , η . 
 
Whole sample  Debt-like  Mixed  Equity-like   
Event window  AAR  t- stat.  AAR  t- stat. AAR  t- stat.  AAR  t- stat. 
-5 -0.0013  1.33  0.0008  2.25  -0.0032 -0.11  -0.0015  0.64 
-4 0.0000  0.53  0.0030  0.17  -0.0015 -1.29  0.0003  1.08 
-3 0.0000  -0.64  0.0038  1.24  -0.0012 -1.04  -0.0027  -1.11 
-2 -0.0008  0.08  -0.0011  -0.82  0.0004  1.63  -0.0027  -0.79 
-1 -0.0019  -1.32  -0.0024  -1.69  0.0000  -0.16  -0.0031  -0.15 
0 -0.0101  -7.33  -0.0077  -4.74  -0.0129 -3.93  -0.0110  -2.97 
1 -0.0051  -2.18  -0.0025  -0.13  -0.0074 -2.47  -0.0075  -1.82 
2 -0.0015  1.46  0.0001  1.79  -0.0025 0.59  -0.0026  -0.52 
3 -0.0006  0.11  -0.0007  -0.59  -0.0001 1.30  -0.0020  -0.10 
4 0.0005  -1.44  0.0002  -1.07  0.0030  -1.50  -0.0011  -0.31 
5 -0.0013  -1.79  0.0000  0.17  -0.0022 -1.61  -0.0018  -1.45 
 ACAR  t- stat.  ACAR  t- stat. ACAR  t- stat.  ACAR  t- stat. 
(0, 1)  -0.0152  -8.29  -0.0102  -4.07  -0.0202 -5.23  -0.0185  -4.16 
(-1,0) -0.0121  -8.68  -0.0102  -5.88  -0.0129 -4.54  -0.0141  -3.92 
(-1,1) -0.0171  -9.32  -0.0126  -4.99  -0.0203 -5.37  -0.0216  -4.96 
(-2,2) -0.0195  -6.85  -0.0136  -3.77  -0.0224 -4.02  -0.0269  -3.97 
(-3,3) -0.0201  -6.29  -0.0105  -3.21  -0.0237 -3.23  -0.0316  -3.97 
(-4,4) -0.0196  -5.85  -0.0074  -3.32  -0.0222 -3.29  -0.0324  -3.60 
(-5,5) -0.0222  -5.68  -0.0067  -2.30  -0.0275 -3.75  -0.0357  -3.86 
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Table 5.2 Comparison of announcement effect among subsample portfolios 
 
Panel A. Differences in CAR among stock returns among subsample portfolios 
  ACAR(-2,2) ACAR(-1,1) ACAR(-1,0) ACAR(0,1) 
Debt-like -0.0136  -0.0126  -0.0102  -0.0102 
Mixed -0.0224 -0.0203 -0.0129 -0.0202 
Equity-like -0.0269  -0.0216  -0.0141  -0.0185 
0.0133 0.0089 0.0039  0.0083 
D–E 
(2.30) (1.96) (0.97)  (2.19) 
0.0088 0.0076 0.0027  0.0100  D-M 
(1.62) (1.66) (0.74)  (2.53) 
0.0045 0.0013 0.0012  -0.0018  M-E 
(0.68) (0.23) (0.26)  (-0.38) 
 
Panel B. Differences in CAR (-2, 2) among subsample portfolios 
 
Note: D-E = (ACAR of the Debt-like portfolio) – (ACAR of the Equity-like portfolio),  
D-M = (ACAR of the Debt-like portfolio) – (ACAR of the Mixed portfolio), 
M-E = (ACAR of the Mixed portfolio) – (ACAR of the Equity-like portfolio). 
T-test statistics for null hypothesis of no differences in ACAR between the debt-like portfolio and the 
equity-like portfolio are reported in Panel A in parentheses.  
 
  Difference Between Means  Simultaneous 90% Confidence Limits 
D-M 0.008798  (-0.005499,  0.023095) 
D-E     0.013276**  (-0.001008, 0.027559) 
M-E 0.004478  (-0.009819,  0.018775)   97
Table 5.3 Regression of announcement effect on hedge ratio Δ 
 
CAR (-2, 2) =  ε β α + Δ +  
Adjusted R-Square =0.0023 
 
Variable  Parameter estimate  Standard Error  t stat.  P > |t| 
Constant -0.0091  0.0054  -1.69  0.091 
β   -0.0156 0.0077  -2.03  0.043 
Note: t statistics are White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent.   98
Table 6 
 Long-run buy and hold returns 
Table 6.1 – Long-run BHR 
 
The buy and hold return (BHR) of portfolio j with n component equities through  1 T  to  2 T  is defined by:  
j BHR ∑ ∏ = = − + ≡
n
i
T
T t t i i R
1 , ] 1 ) 1 ( [
2
1 ω , where  ∑ = =
n
i i i i MVE MVE
1 / ω for a value-weighted (V.W.) 
portfolio, and  n i / 1 = ω  for an equal-weighed (E.W.) portfolio. 
diff. = (average BHR of CB issuers) – (average BHR of matching firms or market index benchmarks) 
P>| t| is the p value from 2 sided T-test of the null hypothesis that D-E is indifferent from 0.  
 
  Whole sample  Debt-like portfolio  Mixed portfolio  Equity-like portfolio 
 n=619  n=209  n=187  n=180 
[-3, 3] years    
V.W.    BHR  diff. P>|t|  BHR diff. P>|t| BHR diff. P>|t| BHR  diff. P>|t|
Issuer 1.639      1.282 2.484   2.545 
Match 0.519 1.120  0.192  0.684 0.598 0.506 0.250 2.234 0.148  0.664  1.295 0.084
Index 1.129  0.510  0.196  1.249 0.033 0.862 1.150 1.334 0.236  1.025 1.520 0.071
E.W.           
Issuer 1.554      1.622 1.902   1.345 
Match 1.146 0.408  0.009  1.593 0.029 0.717 1.144 0.758 0.039  0.859  0.486 0.060
Index 1.216  0.338  0.014  1.449 0.173 0.244 1.231 0.671 0.047  1.047 0.298 0.239
Pre issuances [-3, 0] years    
V.W.    BHR  diff. P>|t|  BHR diff. P>|t| BHR diff. P>|t| BHR  diff. P>|t|
Issuer 1.577      0.706 2.303   3.830 
Match 0.265 1.312  0.017  0.218 0.488 0.172 0.327 1.976 0.459  0.347  3.483 0.039
Index 0.496  1.081  0.009  0.543 0.163 0.305 0.489 1.814 0.116  0.479 3.351 0.041
E.W.           
Issuer 1.321      1.058 1.457   1.544 
Match 0.741 0.580  <.001 0.838 0.220 0.114 0.639 0.818 <.001 0.741  0.803 0.000
Index 0.558  0.763  <.001 0.656 0.402 <.001 0.561 0.896 <.001 0.501  1.043 <.001
Post issuances [0, 3 ] years    
V.W.    BHR  diff. P>|t|  BHR diff. P>|t| BHR diff. P>|t| BHR  diff. P>|t|
Issuer 0.171      0.358 0.188   0.053 
Match 0.230  -0.059  0.707  0.373 -0.015 0.784 0.000 0.188 0.257  0.309 -0.256 0.066
Index 0.404  -0.233  0.026  0.442 -0.084 0.602 0.420 -0.232 0.253  0.351  -0.298 0.101
E.W.           
Issuer 0.147      0.350 0.179   -0.05 
Match 0.306  -0.159  0.011  0.418 -0.068 0.798 0.346 -0.167 0.149  0.229 -0.280 0.001
Index  0.374 -0.227 <.001 0.439 -0.089 0.322 0.390 -0.211 0.005 0.301  -0.352 <.001
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Table 6.2 - Comparison of long-run buy and hold returns between Debt-like 
portfolio and Equity-like portfolio 
 
  D–E  t-stat.  P > |t| 
[-3, 3] years     
V.W. -1.263  -1.63  0.105 
E.W. 0.277  0.92  0.359 
Pre issuances [-3, 0] years     
V.W. -3.124  -1.97  0.051 
E.W. -0.486  -2.36  0.019 
Post issuances [0, 3 ] years     
V.W. 0.305  1.12  0.263 
E.W. 0.401  3.63  0.000 
Note: 1. D–E = (average BHR of the Debt-like portfolio) – (average BHR of the Equity-like portfolio). 
2. P>| t| is the p value from 2 sided T-test of the null hypothesis that D–E is indifferent from 0.  
 
   100
                                                                  Table 7 
Long-run stock return performance by Fama French three factor model 
Table 7.1 Whole sample long-run stock returns 
 
There are 383 monthly portfolios, from February, 1976 to December, 2007, with a maximum of 
170 companies per portfolio to a minimum of 1 company in each portfolio. White 
Heteroskedasticity-Consistent t statistics are reported in parentheses.  
 
) ( ) ( ) ( )] ( ) ( [ ) ( ) ( t t hHML t sSMB t RF t RM t RF t R ε β α + + + − + = −  
 
  α   β   s h  Adj-R2 
E.W. /OLS  -0.005 
(-2.74) 
1.272 
(22.59) 
0.843 
(10.14) 
-0.153 
(-1.83) 
0.7937 
E.W. /WLS  -0.007 
(-6.16) 
1.149 
(34.81) 
0.809 
(14.17) 
-0.179 
(-2.44) 
0.9219 
V.W. /OLS  0.002 
(1.10) 
1.223 
(18.68) 
0.402 
(4.66) 
-0.301 
(-3.31) 
0.7136 
V.W. /WLS  0.001 
(0.81) 
1.133 
(29.70) 
0.348 
(5.28) 
-0.314 
(-4.45) 
0.8659 
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Table 7.2 Sub- sample long-run stock returns 
 
There are 383 monthly bond-like portfolios, from February, 1976 to December, 2007, with a 
maximum of 45 companies per portfolio to a minimum of 1 company in each portfolio. There are 
382 monthly mixed portfolios, from March, 1976 to December, 2007, with a maximum of 38 
companies per portfolio to a minimum of 1 company in each portfolio. There are 342 
discontinuous monthly equity-like portfolios, from June, 1976 to December, 2007, with a 
maximum of 84 companies per portfolio to a minimum of 1 company in each portfolio. White 
Heteroskedasticity-Consistent t statistics are reported in parentheses.  
) ( ) ( ) ( )] ( ) ( [ ) ( ) ( t t hHML t sSMB t RF t RM t RF t R ε β α + + + − + = −  
 
Panel A. Debt-like portfolio 
  α   β   s h  Adj-R2 
E.W. /OLS  -0.006 
(-2.75) 
1.141 
(20.18) 
0.546 
(7.30) 
0.213 
(2.63) 
0.6545 
E.W. /WLS  -0.003 
(-2.17) 
1.084 
(27.89) 
0.449 
(5.68) 
0.036 
(0.55) 
0.8339 
V.W. /OLS  -0.001 
(-0.37) 
1.148 
(12.51) 
0.148 
(1.65) 
0.289 
(2.55) 
0.4854 
V.W. /WLS  0.002 
(1.20) 
1.044 
(19.08) 
0.090 
(1.05) 
-0.037 
(-0.41) 
0.7343 
 
Panel B.  Mixed portfolio 
  α   β   s h  Adj-R2 
E.W. /OLS  -0.0001 
(-0.06) 
1.289 
(13.97) 
1.009 
(6.75) 
-0.267 
(-1.85) 
0.6133 
E.W. /WLS  -0.008 
(-3.22) 
1.174 
(18.02) 
0.886 
(8.00) 
-0.227 
(-1.88) 
0.7167 
V.W. /OLS  0.008 
(2.33) 
1.304 
(13.30) 
0.663 
(4.10) 
-0.775 
(-4.63) 
0.5810 
V.W. /WLS  0.001 
(0.16) 
1.144 
(13.97) 
0.530 
(3.12) 
-0.822 
(-5.01) 
0.6390 
 
Panel C. Equity-like portfolio  
  α   β   s h  Adj-R2 
E.W. /OLS  -0.009 
(-1.46) 
1.189 
(5.41) 
2.000 
(3.39) 
-0.923 
(-2.63) 
0.5219 
E.W. /WLS  -0.008 
(-4.06) 
1.122 
(15.84) 
1.045 
(12.15) 
-0.405 
(-2.35) 
0.9167 
V.W. /OLS  -0.004 
(-0.60) 
1.118 
(5.01) 
1.780 
(2.90) 
-1.082 
(-2.93) 
0.4720 
V.W. /WLS  -0.001 
(-0.11) 
1.132 
(12.27) 
0.784 
(4.68) 
-0.694 
(-3.43) 
0.7925 
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                                                                  Table 7 
Long-run operating performance 
Table 8.1 – Raw operating performance 
 
OIBD/Assets= Operating Income before depreciation (#13) + Interest income (#62)/ total assets (#6). 
Values in () under the columns of means are the statistics testing the null hypothesis that there is difference 
between the pre and post average operating performances using t test. The values in the columns of 
medians over the [-3, 3], [-3, -1], and [1, 3] years’ windows are calculated as the medians of each CB 
issuer’s average performance in the [-3, 3], [-3, -1], and [1, 3] years’ windows. Values in <> are the test 
statistics of difference between the pre and post medians using Wilcoxon rank signed test.  The z-statistic 
from the Wilcoxon-signed-rank test for the null hypothesis of no difference in the issuers’ median operating 
performances from pre issuance period to post issuance period using is computed as:  
2 / ) 1 2 )( 1 (
4 / ) 1 (
1
+ +
+ −
= ∑ =
+
n n n
n n r
Z
n
i i
~N(0,1) for large sample size n,  where∑ =
+ n
i i r
1 = ) 0 (
1 > ∑ = i
n
i i r I V and 
pre
i
post
i i V V V − =  is the difference in the operating performance (measured by OIBD/Assets) between 
pre CB issuance period and the post CB issuance period, and  i r  is the ranking of  i V  in an ascending order. 
 
    Whole sample  Debt-like  Mixed   Equity-like  
Relative  year  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
-3 13.553  15.005 14.182 14.709 10.939 12.793 15.536  17.455
-2 12.285  14.605 15.094 14.971 8.627  12.848 13.152  16.079
-1 12.515  14.312 14.358 14.884 10.343 13.930 12.870  15.623
0 11.634  13.183 13.527 14.128 8.423  12.269 12.912  13.746
1  11.392 13.37 14.242 14.523 11.360 13.604 8.382 11.911
2  9.323 12.667 14.107 14.708 8.221 10.866 5.261 11.424
3 11.390  13.029 13.601 13.940 10.507 11.310 9.676  12.356
[-3,3] 11.651  13.141 14.114 14.194 9.727  12.343 11.249  13.525
Pre issuance [-3,-1]  12.312  14.429 14.256 14.485 9.941  13.180 13.734  16.155
Post issuance [1, 3]  10.559  12.271 13.988 14.207 9.539  11.441 9.186  11.649
Post - Pre  -1.753 -2.158 -0.269 -0.277 -0.401 -1.739 -4.548 -4.505
  (-2.43) <-4.91> (-0.42) <-2.49> (-0.27) <-2.20> (-3.14) <-2.20>
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Table 8.2 – Abnormal operating performance 
 
OIBD/Assets= Operating Income before depreciation (#13) + Interest income (#62)/ total assets (#6). 
Values in () under the columns of means are the statistics testing the null hypothesis that there is difference 
between the pre and post average operating performances using t test. The values in the columns of 
medians over the [-3, 3], [-3, -1], and [1, 3] years’ windows are calculated as the medians of each CB 
issuer’s average performance in the [-3, 3], [-3, -1], and [1, 3] years’ windows. Values in <> are the test 
statistics of difference between the pre and post medians using Wilcoxon rank signed test.  The z-statistic 
from the Wilcoxon-signed-rank test for the null hypothesis of no difference in the issuers’ median operating 
performances from pre issuance period to post issuance period using is computed as:  
2 / ) 1 2 )( 1 (
4 / ) 1 (
1
+ +
+ −
= ∑ =
+
n n n
n n r
Z
n
i i
~N(0,1) for large sample size n,  where∑ =
+ n
i i r
1 = ) 0 (
1 > ∑ = i
n
i i r I V and 
pre
i
post
i i V V V − =  is the difference in the operating performance (measured by OIBD/Assets) between 
pre CB issuance period and the post CB issuance period, and  i r  is the ranking of  i V  in an ascending order. 
 
  Whole sample   Debt-like  Mixed    Equity-like  
Relative  year  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
-3  -1.937 0.158 -0.545 0.402 -3.947 -2.063 -1.127 4.369 
-2  -2.924 -1.214 0.151 0.070 -6.686 -3.789 -1.940 -1.424
-1  -2.721 -0.595 -0.451 -0.610 -5.139 -1.014 -2.481 0.245 
0  -3.752 -1.549 -1.019 -0.622 -7.692 -3.650 -2.003 -2.784
1  -2.697 -1.742 -0.843 -1.377 -2.210 -1.315 -4.827 -4.082
2  -7.993 -2.542 -1.999 -1.255 -6.847 -4.714  -14.161  -2.540
3  -5.315 -2.415 -2.098 -1.897 -4.817 -3.256 -8.533 -6.609
[-3,  3]  -3.786 -1.939 -0.917 -1.194 -5.454 -3.312 -4.939 -0.519
Pre  issuance  [-3,-1] -2.639 -0.438 -0.281 -0.023 -5.294 -2.355 -1.913 0.237 
Post  issuance  [1,  3] -5.390 -2.542 -1.443 -1.416 -5.605 -3.210 -7.158 -3.875
Post - Pre  -2.751 -2.104 -1.161 -1.394 -0.311 -0.856 -5.245 -4.112
  (-2.05) <-4.02> (-1.22) <-1.93> (-0.13) <-2.61> (-1.79) <-2.26>
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Table 8.3 - Comparison of operating performance between Debt-like portfolio and 
Equity-like portfolio 
 
 D–E  t-stat.  P  >  |t| 
[-3, 3] years      
Raw 2.865  -2.1995  0.07 
Abnormal 4.022  -2.4559  0.03 
Pre issuances [-3, -1] years      
Raw 0.522  -0.4347  0.71 
Abnormal 1.632  -2.2059  0.08 
Post issuances [1, 3 ] years      
Raw 4.802  -4.5568  0.04 
Abnormal 5.716  -2.0108  0.10 
Note: 1. D–E = (average operating performance of the Debt-like portfolio) – 
(average operating performance of the Equity-like portfolio) 
2. P>| t| is the p value from 2 sided T-test of the null hypothesis that D-E is indifferent from 0.  
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Table 8.4- Comparison of operating performance between issuers and matching 
firms 
 
diff. = (median operating performance of the CB issuers) – (median operating performance of the 
matching firms). The z-statistic is the test statistic of the null hypothesis that there is no difference 
between the issuers’ and the industry matchers’ median operating performance using Wilcoxon-
signed-rank test. 
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i i V V V − =   is the difference in operating performance (measured by OIBD/Assets) 
between issuer-i’s and its industry matching firm’s, and  i r  is the ranking of  i V  in an ascending 
order. 
 
 Whole  sample  Debt-like Mixed  Equity-like 
Relative year  diff. z-  stat. diff. z-  stat. diff. z-stat.  diff. z-  stat. 
-3  0.158 -0.40 0.402 -0.57 -2.063  -0.52 4.369 -0.04 
-2  -1.214 -1.00 0.070 0.15 -3.789  -1.72  -1.424 -0.11 
-1  -0.595 -1.52 -0.610 -0.46 -1.014 -1.25 0.245 -0.53 
0  -1.549 -3.18 -0.622 -0.79 -3.650 -2.71 -2.784 -1.29 
1  -1.742 -2.40 -1.377 -0.83 -1.315 -0.72 -4.082 -1.78 
2  -2.542 -3.47 -1.255 -1.23 -4.714 -1.94 -2.540 -2.17 
3  -2.415 -3.58 -1.897 -1.05 -3.256 -1.95 -6.609 -2.53 
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                                                                  Table 9 
Long-run equity risks  
 
Table 9.1- Pre and post issuances comparison of equity risks 
 
Under the columns of means, the values reported in ( ) are t-statistics using T-test for the null hypothesis of 
no difference between the pre issuance and post issuance average risks. Under the columns of medians, the 
values reported in <> are z-statistics using Wilcoxon signed rank test for the null hypothesis of no 
difference between the pre issuance and post issuance median risks. 
 
 Whole  sample  Debt-like  Mixed  Equity-like 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Systematic Risk                 
[-3,3] 1.012  0.975  0.926  0.893  1.065  1.051  1.088  1.012 
Pre  issuance  [-3,0] 1.043 1.000 0.954 0.895 1.100 1.056 1.118 1.045 
Post  issuance  [0,3] 0.981 0.921 0.896 0.867 1.029 1.013 1.061 1.023 
Post-pre -0.062  -0.079  -0.059 -0.028 -0.071 -0.042 -0.058 -0.022 
  (-2.44)  <-2.68> (-2.02) <-2.07> (-1.20) <-0.65>  (-1.21)  <-1.90>
Idiosyncratic Risk                 
[-3,3] 0.114  0.077  0.056  0.043  0.141  0.101  0.140  0.101 
Pre  issuance  [-3,0] 0.096 0.067 0.051 0.040 0.120 0.086 0.115 0.090 
Post  issuance  [0,3] 0.131 0.074 0.061 0.043 0.163 0.087 0.162 0.098 
Post-pre  0.035 0.007 0.010 0.003 0.042 0.001 0.048 0.008 
 (4.85)  <3.32> (2.46) <1.78> (2.50) <0.47> (3.55)  <2.92>
Total Equity Risk                 
[-3,3] 0.126  0.088  0.064  0.050  0.155  0.110  0.156  0.118 
Pre  issuance  [-3,0] 0.107 0.078 0.059 0.049 0.132 0.099 0.132 0.098 
Post  issuance  [0,3] 0.144 0.085 0.069 0.050 0.178 0.099 0.178 0.117 
Post-pre  0.037 0.007 0.010 0.001 0.047 -0.001 0.046 0.018 
 (4.87)  <3.84> (2.48) <1.64> (2.63) <0.82> (3.26) <3.32>
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Table 9.2- Comparison of equity risks with non-issuing matching firms 
 
The values reported are the mean and median of the abnormal risks (risks of the CB issuers – risks of the 
matching firms). The values reported under the columns of means are t-statistics from T-test of the null 
hypothesis of no difference in average risks between the issuers and the matching firms. The values 
reported under the columns of medians are z-statistics from Wilcoxon-signed-rank test. 
 
  Whole Sample  Debt-like  Mixed  Equity-like 
Relative day  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median  Mean  Median
0.115 0.115 -0.002 0.029 0.078 0.068 0.363 0.315  [-756, -504) 
(-1.18) <1.48> (-0.58) <-0.32> (-0.06) <0.25> (-3.54) <3.40>
0.147 0.135 0.043 0.037 0.182 0.138 0.281 0.321  [-504, -252) 
(-3.33) <3.34> (-0.04) <0.00> (-2.08) <2.20>  (-3.13)  <3.48>
0.208  0.272 0.07 0.167  0.277 0.383 0.349 0.334  [-252, 0) 
(-4.62) <5.63> (-0.66) <1.43> (-3.20) <4.15>  (-3.62)  <3.77>
0.289 0.301 0.148 0.173  0.37 0.369 0.404  0.43  (0, 252] 
(-7.54) <7.37> (-2.07) <2.45> (-5.14) <4.75>  (-6.28)  <5.65>
0.224 0.221 (0.04) 0.031 0.335 0.369 0.341 0.357  (252, 504] 
(-4.63) <4.97> (-0.02) <0.67> (-4.32) <4.04>  (-3.30)  <3.57>
0.121 0.257 -0.011 0.098 0.178 0.452 0.227 0.318 
 
Systematic 
 
Risk 
(504, 756] 
(-3.73) <3.64> (-0.59) <-0.32> (-2.80) <2.62> (-3.48) <3.45>
0.000 0.004 -0.014 -0.002 0.011 0.011 0.007 0.012  [-756, -504) 
(-0.20) <-0.25> (-3.02) <-2.56> (-0.40) <0.35> (-1.78) <1.94>
-0.019 0.001 -0.016 -0.002 -0.017 0.002 -0.021 0.009  [-504, -252) 
(-2.41) <-0.77> (-3.53) <-3.11> (-1.40) <0.42> (-0.07) <1.17>
-0.023 -0.003 -0.027 -0.006 -0.038 0.005 -0.021 0.009  [-252, 0) 
(-3.45) <-1.83> (-3.54) <-3.63> (-1.96) <0.23> (-0.63) <0.54>
-0.035 -0.011 -0.048 -0.016 -0.027 0.005 -0.021 -0.019  (0, 252] 
(-3.64) <-4.16> (-3.52) <-4.61> (-1.41) <-0.56> (-0.89) <-1.08>
-0.021 0.000 -0.046 -0.015 -0.005 0.017 -0.015 -0.012  (252, 504] 
(-1.68) <-1.37> (-3.08) <-3.76> (-0.36) <1.26> (-0.43) <-0.57>
-0.011 -0.004 -0.045 -0.009 0.048 0.008  -0.038 -0.011 
 
Idiosyncratic  
 
Risk 
(504, 756] 
(-0.21) <0.05> (-2.13) <-2.60> (-1.13) <1.46> (-0.27) <0.41>
0.000 0.003 -0.016 -0.004 0.01 0.012 0.011 0.013  [-756, -504) 
(-0.21) <-0.10> (-3.06) <-2.52> (-0.38) <0.59> (-2.04) <2.10>
-0.012 0.006 -0.016 -0.001 -0.035 0.004 -0.005  0.01  [-504, -252) 
(-1.28) <-0.27> (-3.42) <-2.99> (-1.30) <0.68> (-0.98) <1.59>
-0.02 0.000  -0.026 -0.007  -0.015 0.017 -0.017 0.012  [-252, 0) 
(-3.11) <-1.24> (-3.48) <-3.25> (-1.79) <0.44> (-0.26) <1.00>
-0.03 -0.013  -0.047 -0.015 -0.02 0.007 -0.013 -0.009  (0, 252] 
(-3.25) <-3.16> (-3.41) <-4.32> (-1.19) <-0.18> (-0.49) <-0.16>
-0.017 0.003 -0.047 -0.013 0.002 0.019 -0.01 -0.016  (252, 504] 
(-1.31) <-0.88> (-3.07) <-3.62> (-0.64) <1.52> (-0.09) <-0.20>
-0.007 -0.004 -0.044 -0.007 0.058 0.011  -0.035 -0.006 
 
Total  
 
Equity 
 
Risk 
(504, 756] 
(-0.27) <0.38> (-2.10) <-2.37> (-1.18) <1.63> (-0.30) <0.61>
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Table 9.3- Comparison between Debt-like portfolio and Equity-like portfolio 
  D-E  t -stat.  P > |t| 
[-3, 3] years        
Systematic risk  -0.162  -5.80  <.0001 
Idiosyncratic risk  -0.084  -11.63  <.0001 
Total equity risk  -0.093  -12.20  <.0001 
Pre issuances [-3, 0] years        
Systematic risk  -0.164  -3.86  0.0001 
Idiosyncratic risk  -0.064  -12.27  <.0001 
Total equity risk  -0.073  -10.86  <.0001 
Post issuances [0, 3 ] years        
Systematic risk  -0.165  -4.48  <.0001 
Idiosyncratic risk  -0.102  -7.86  <.0001 
Total equity risk  -0.109  -8.34  <.0001 
Note: 1. D–E = (average risk of Debt-like portfolio) – (average risk of Equity-like portfolio) 
2. P>| t| is the p value from 2 sided T-test of the null hypothesis that D–E is indifferent from 0.  
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                                                                  Table 10 
Regressions of announcement effect on long-run operating performance 
 
CAR (-2, 2) =  β α + * pre-issuance operating performance +ε  
Adjusted R-Square = -0.0006s 
Variable  Parameter estimate  Standard Error  t stat.  P > |t| 
Constant -0.027755  0.006023  -4.607939  0.0000 
β   0.000186 0.000315  0.590479  0.5552 
 
 
CAR (-2, 2) =  β α + * post-issuance operating performance +ε  
Adjusted R-Square = 0.0095 
Variable  Parameter estimate  Standard Error  t stat.  P > |t| 
Constant -0.029182  0.004174  -6.991290  0.0000 
β   0.000403 0.000164  2.454455  0.0146 
Note: t statistics are White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent. 
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                                                                  Table 11 
Regressions of announcement effect on long-run operating performance conditional 
on equity risks 
 
Table- 11.1 Regression of announcement effect on pre issuance long-run variables 
  Constant  Operating 
performance 
Equity 
beta 
Residual 
variance 
Total 
Risk 
Adj-R2  Number 
of obs. 
Pre issuance 
variables 
            
 -0.0277  0.0002     -0.092  427 
 ( -4.61) (0.59)       
 -0.0125    -0.0114     0.0069  601 
 ( -1.98)   (-1.99)       
  -0.0206     -0.0363  0.0044  601 
 ( -5.35)     (-0.98)     
 -0.0191       -0.0455  0.0066  601 
 ( -4.69)       (-1.28)    
 -0.0176  0.0002  -0.0097  0.0002    0.0009 427 
  (-1.81)  (0.52)  (-1.50)  (0.01)      
 -0.0239  0.0001    -0.0221  -0.0010 427 
  (-3.12)  (0.27)    (-0.63)    
Note: 1. The dependent variable is the short-run announcement effect, measured by CAR (-2, 2). 
2. White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent t statistics are reported in parentheses below the estimated 
OLS coefficients.  
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Table- 11.2 Regression of announcement effect on post issuance long-run variables 
  Constant  Operating 
performance 
Equity 
beta 
Residual
variance 
Total 
Risk 
Adj-R2  Number 
of obs. 
Post issuance 
variables 
          
 -0.0292  0.0004      0.0095  372 
 ( -6.99) (2.45)        
 -0.0226   -0.0017    -0.0015  601 
 ( -4.47)   (-0.39)        
 -0.0203     -0.0289    0.0054  601 
 ( -6.04)     (-1.42)      
 -0.0200      -0.0282 0.0056  601 
 ( -5.78)      (-1.44)    
 -0.0259  0.0004  -0.0023 -0.0065  0.0047  372 
 ( -3.36) (2.53) (-0.39) (-0.36)      
 -0.0285  0.0004     -0.0041 0.0070  372 
 ( -7.01) (2.51)     (-0.27)    
Note: 1. The dependent variable is the short-run announcement effect, measured by CAR (-2, 2). 
2. White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent t statistics are reported in parentheses below the estimated 
OLS coefficients. 
 
 